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Opinions Actionable As Securities Fraud 
Wendy Gerwick Couture* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article proposes a new analytical framework to apply to 
statements of opinion in securities fraud cases. Although 
statements of opinion form the basis of some of the most cutting-
edge securities fraud claims—such as those asserted against 
securities analysts and credit rating agencies—statements of 
opinion do not fit squarely within the elements of securities fraud. 
In particular, three issues arise: (1) When is a statement of opinion 
false so as to qualify as a misrepresentation? (2) When is a 
statement of opinion material? (3) And, for that matter, what is the 
distinction between a statement of fact and a statement of opinion? 
Courts confronting these issues apply various analytically unsound 
and inconsistent tests. In response, this Article proposes a novel 
approach, drawing on the policy rationales underlying securities 
fraud claims, case law and scholarly commentary addressing how 
to apply the elements of securities fraud to statements of opinion, 
and comparable analyses in the contexts of common law fraud and 
defamation. First, this Article argues that statements of opinion are 
only false if both objectively unreasonable and subjectively 
disbelieved. Second, this Article proposes the following new 
evaluation–inference test to differentiate statements of opinion 
from statements of fact: Does the statement express the speaker’s 
evaluation or inference of facts? Finally, this Article proposes the 
following new reasonable implication test to distinguish opinions 
that are immaterial as a matter of law from those that are 
potentially material: Does the opinion reasonably imply an 
allegedly false, material fact?  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most compelling questions in modern securities 
litigation is how to treat allegedly fraudulent statements of 
opinion—such as securities-analyst recommendations, credit 
ratings, and statements of corporate optimism. Much of the 
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securities litigation in the wake of the stock market crash of 2000 
and the financial crisis of 2008 has centered on allegedly 
fraudulent opinions. After the 2000 crash, sell-side securities 
analysts were widely blamed for allegedly issuing “buy” 
recommendations consistent with the interests of their firms’ 
investment banking clients but inconsistent with their own 
opinions about the covered stocks,1 leading to widespread 
securities litigation.2 Similarly, in the wake of the 2008 crisis, 
credit rating agencies were pilloried for allegedly issuing credit 
ratings consistent with the interests of their firms’ clients but 
inconsistent with their own opinions about the rated securities,3 
also leading to securities litigation.4 Finally, in the wake of both 
crashes, many companies—including quintessential examples like 
Worldcom and Citigroup—were sued by their investors for 
allegedly expressing unduly optimistic opinions about their 
businesses.5 
                                                                                                             
 1. E.g., Joint Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, N.Y. Attorney Gen.’s 
Office, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs. Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, & N.Y. Stock 
Exch., Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions 
Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 
28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm (announcing 
the finalization of a global settlement with ten firms “follow[ing] joint 
investigations by the regulators of allegations of undue influence of investment 
banking interests on securities research at brokerage firms”). 
 2. E.g., In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 
2005) (Purchasers of Agilent Technologies, Inc. stock alleged that the “buy” 
ratings in Credit Suisse’s analyst reports were fraudulent because the analysts 
“actually believed that wise investors should not purchase Agilent securities.”). 
 3. CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION xxv 
(2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports 
/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf (“We conclude the failures of credit rating 
agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction. The three 
credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown.”). 
 4. E.g., King Cnty., Wash. v. IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, 708 F. 
Supp. 2d 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Investors who purchased notes issued by a 
structured investment vehicle alleged that credit rating agencies assigned 
fraudulently high credit ratings to the notes.). 
 5. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 229 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Citigroup investors premised securities fraud claims on 
various alleged misrepresentations, including the CEO’s statement that “I feel 
good about the composition of our portfolios, not only in the corporate and 
sovereign area but especially in the U.S. mortgage area where we have avoided 
the riskier products at some cost to revenues in prior years.”); In re MCI 
Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 778, 786 (S.D. Miss. 2002) 
(Worldcom investors premised securities fraud claims on various alleged 
misrepresentations, including the company’s statement that “[t]he local and global 
reach of our network continues to set Worldcom apart from the rest of the 
industry.”). 
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Applying the elements of a securities fraud claim to statements 
of opinion as opposed to statements of fact is like fitting a square 
peg in a round hole. As courts have interpreted § 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5,6 a private claim 
for securities fraud contains the following elements: a 
misrepresentation or an omission of a material fact; scienter; a 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; reliance upon the misrepresentation 
or omission; economic loss; and loss causation.7 When these 
elements are applied to statements of opinion, three issues arise: 
(1) When is a statement of opinion false so as to qualify as a 
misrepresentation? (2) When is a statement of opinion material? 
(3) And, for that matter, what is the distinction between a 
statement of fact and a statement of opinion?  
Courts confronting these issues have adopted various tests that 
are analytically unsound, that yield inconsistent results, and that 
fail to further the fundamental policy goal of the securities acts “to 
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”8 For example, 
without articulating why statements of opinion should be afforded 
special treatment, courts routinely require that the statements be 
both subjectively disbelieved and objectively unreasonable in order 
to be false, effectively raising the applicable scienter level for 
statements of opinion.9 Despite the fact that the fact–opinion 
distinction is thereby potentially outcome–determinative, courts 
apply a series of illogical and inconsistent tests to make this 
distinction.10 Finally, courts routinely dismiss opinions as 
immaterial as a matter of law, characterizing them as mere 
“puffery,” even if reasonable investors could rely on the opinions 
to their detriment when making investment decisions.11 
Several eminent scholars have criticized courts’ treatment of 
statements other than “plain vanilla” statements of fact. For 
example, Professor Jennifer O’Hare, noting courts’ inconsistent 
application of the puffery defense to vague statements, has 
proposed a framework to analyze the materiality of these 
statements.12 Professor Donald C. Langevoort has identified 
                                                                                                             
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 7. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157 
(2008). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. See infra Part III.C. 
 11. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
 12. Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-
Emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1697, 1709, 1737 (1998). 
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courts’ inconsistent treatment of half-truths and proposed a 
framework for assessing whether half-truths should be actionable 
as securities fraud.13 Professor David A. Hoffman has proposed a 
new presumed liability regime to apply to so-called puffery, which 
he identifies in the securities context as “vague statement[s] of 
corporate optimism” about the future or about current conditions.14 
This Article contends that this deep body of scholarship, although 
apparently focused on different subsets of statements, has a 
common core: statements of opinion. 
In response, this Article proposes a new analytical framework 
to apply to statements of opinion in securities fraud cases. This 
framework draws on policy rationales underlying securities fraud 
claims, case law and scholarly commentary addressing how to 
apply the elements of securities fraud to statements of opinion, and 
comparable analyses in the contexts of common law fraud and 
defamation. First, this Article agrees with most courts having 
addressed the issue that statements of opinion are only false if both 
objectively unreasonable and subjectively disbelieved. The 
subjective falsity requirement recognizes that there is “something 
special” about opinions, which reflect the speaker’s mental 
processes. Additionally, in light of the consequent necessity of 
differentiating between statements of fact and statements of 
opinion, this Article proposes the following new evaluation–
inference test to make this distinction: Does the statement express 
the speaker’s evaluation or inference of facts? This test, which 
draws on comparable precedent in the contexts of defamation and 
common law fraud, pinpoints those statements that contain the 
aforementioned “something special.” Further, this Article responds 
to courts’ unsound materiality analyses of opinions by proposing 
the following new reasonable implication test to distinguish 
statements that are immaterial as a matter of law from those that 
are potentially material: Does the opinion reasonably imply an 
allegedly false, material fact? Comparable precedent developed in 
the defamation pure–mixed opinion context and in the common-
law-fraud puffery–opinion context should guide courts as they 
apply the reasonable implication test in the securities fraud 
context.  
In order to present this proposed analytical framework, this 
Article proceeds in four additional parts. Part II reviews the 
precedent establishing the rule that statements of opinion are 
                                                                                                             
 13. Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by 
Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 88, 113 (1999). 
 14. David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
1395, 1405–11, 1445 (2006). 
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potentially actionable as securities fraud and explains why 
statements of opinion do not fit squarely within the elements of 
securities fraud. Next, Part III argues that a statement of opinion, 
unlike a statement of fact, is only false if it is subjectively false 
(i.e., disbelieved by the speaker). Therefore, because the 
distinction between statements of fact and opinion is potentially 
outcome determinative, Part III proposes the novel evaluation–
inference test to identify statements of opinion for purposes of 
securities fraud. In Part IV, turning to the materiality of those 
statements that thereby qualify as opinions, this Article proposes 
the new reasonable implication test to differentiate potentially 
material opinions from mere puffery. Finally, Part V summarizes 
this novel analytical rubric and briefly concludes. 
II. OPINIONS CAN FORM THE BASIS OF SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS 
Although courts occasionally state otherwise,15 most courts 
recognize that statements of opinion are potentially actionable as 
securities fraud because they make implicit factual representations.16 
In particular, a statement of opinion contains the implicit factual 
representations (1) that the speaker actually holds the opinion 
expressed, and (2) that the opinion has a reasonable basis in fact.17  
Indeed, in the seminal case of Virginia Bankshares v. 
Sandburg, the Supreme Court soundly rejected the argument that 
statements of opinion are per se not actionable under § 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, which—as implemented by S.E.C. Rule 
14a-9—prohibits false or misleading statements in proxy 
statements.18 The Court’s ruling has been widely applied to claims 
pursuant to § 10(b) and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5, which uses virtually 
                                                                                                             
 15. E.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Likewise, statements of opinion are insufficient to form the 
basis of a misrepresentation or omission complaint under § 10(b).”). 
 16. In re Nat’l Century Fin’l Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court has ‘rejected the argument that 
statements containing opinions or beliefs . . . could not be a basis for’ an action 
for securities fraud.” (quoting Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 
1993))); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“Classifying ratings as opinions does not automatically shield them from 
liability under the securities laws.” (citing Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 
U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991))). 
 17. In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d at 47 (“[A] statement of opinion may be 
considered factual in at least two respects: as a statement that the speaker 
actually holds the opinion expressed and as a statement about the subject matter 
underlying the opinion.”). 
 18. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991).  
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identical language to prohibit false or misleading statements in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.19  
In Virginia Bankshares, a minority shareholder alleged that the 
board of directors solicited proxies for voting on a merger proposal 
by means of materially false or misleading statements of fact.20 In 
particular, the shareholder alleged that the board’s assertions that 
the merger plan allowed the minority shareholders to achieve 
“high” value and that the merger price was “fair” were materially 
misleading because the merger plan undervalued the shares.21 
Rejecting the company’s argument that “statements of opinion or 
belief incorporating indefinite and unverifiable expressions cannot 
be actionable as misstatements of material fact,”22 the Supreme 
Court explained that the directors’ opinions were factual in two 
senses: “as statements that the directors do act for the reasons 
given or hold the belief stated and as statements about the subject 
matter of the reason or belief expressed.”23  
Some courts have suggested that a statement of opinion makes 
a third implicit factual representation: “that the speaker is not 
aware of any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the 
accuracy of the statement.”24 This is merely a restatement of the 
second implicit representation: that the opinion has a reasonable 
basis in fact. If undisclosed facts tended to seriously undermine the 
accuracy of an opinion, it—by definition—would lack a reasonable 
basis in fact. Take, for example, the statement that “the new drug is 
proving highly effective in clinical trials.” If, in truth, the drug 
were not any more effective than a placebo, the second implicit 
representation—that the opinion has a reasonable basis in fact—
would be false. There would be no need to resort to the purported 
third implicit representation—that the speaker was not aware of 
any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the 
statement’s accuracy. Therefore, this purported third implicit 
                                                                                                             
 19. Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The court in 
Virginia Bankshares was concerned with Section 14(a), not Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act. Section 14 concerns proxy statements, whereas 
Section 10 concerns other statements by a corporation. Virginia Bankshares is 
instructive for this case, however, because the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has promulgated the same rule for each section: violations occur 
under each section whenever a statement is false or a material omission makes 
the statements which are made misleading.”). 
 20. Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1088–89. 
 21. Id. at 1088. 
 22. Id. at 1090. 
 23. Id. at 1092. 
 24. E.g., In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
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factual representation is duplicative, circular,25 and risks 
transforming an affirmative misrepresentation case (premised on 
the allegedly false opinion) into a nondisclosure case (premised on 
the failure to disclose the allegedly undermining facts).26  
Even though securities fraud claims can be premised on 
statements of opinion, opinions do not fit squarely within the 
traditional elements of a securities fraud claim.27 First, when is a 
statement of opinion false so as to qualify as a “misrepresentation 
of fact”? As explained above, an opinion makes two implicit 
factual representations: (1) that the speaker actually holds the 
opinion expressed, and (2) that the opinion has a reasonable basis 
in fact. Is an opinion false if one of these implicit representations is 
false, or does falsity require that both be false? 
                                                                                                             
 25. E.g., In re Trex Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 454 F. Supp. 2d 560, 577 (W.D. 
Va. 2006) (“The analysis is somewhat circular when the plaintiffs claim that an 
omission renders an affirmative statement misleading.”); In re No. Nine Visual 
Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D. Mass. 1999) (“[T]he Class has 
cited a number of affirmative allegations that it believes are actionably 
misleading based on the failure to disclose the inventory valuation problem. The 
Court must ask: Are these allegations claims of nondisclosure . . . or are they 
claims of affirmative misstatement . . . ?”). See also John S. Poole, Improving 
the Reliability of Management Forecasts, 14 J. CORP. L. 547, 556 (1989) 
(declining to treat the half-truth principle “as an inherent implied representation 
unique to opinions and predictions”). 
 26. In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“Nevertheless, a duty to disclose arises when disclosure is necessary to 
make prior statements not misleading.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 248–49 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Once the 
defendants engaged in public discussions concerning the benefits of Type II 
affiliation and the no-deposit programs, they had a duty to disclose a ‘mix of 
information’ that is not misleading.”); In re Apollo Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 509 F. 
Supp. 2d 837, 841 (D. Ariz. 2007) (“In other words, while Defendants may not 
have an affirmative duty to disclose interim regulatory findings, they do have ‘a 
duty to disclose material facts that are necessary to make disclosed statements, 
whether mandatory or volunteered, not misleading.’” (quoting Hanon v. 
Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 504 (9th Cir. 1992))). Although this 
distinction might seem like parsing between two sides of the same coin, a 
nondisclosure fraud case is potentially easier for a plaintiff to win than an 
affirmative misrepresentation fraud case, providing for a “run-around” of the 
elements of an affirmative misrepresentation case without a reasonable basis. 
For one, reliance is presumed in nondisclosure cases but not in affirmative 
misrepresentation cases. Moreover, the subjective falsity requirement discussed 
below in Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C would arguably not apply if the claim were 
premised on the failure to disclose rather than on the affirmatively false opinion. 
 27. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157 
(2008) (listing the elements of securities fraud as: (1) a misrepresentation or an 
omission of a material fact; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance 
upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation). 
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Second, when does a statement of opinion misrepresent 
material facts? For purposes of securities fraud, materiality 
requires “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important” in deciding how to invest.28 When 
would a reasonable investor rely on a statement of opinion as 
opposed to dismissing it as mere puffery? 
Finally, intrinsically intertwined in the above two issues is the 
most pressing question of all: What is a statement of opinion for 
purposes of securities fraud? If a statement’s characterization as an 
opinion affected neither the falsity analysis nor the materiality 
analysis, this would be a moot question. If, however, as most 
courts and this Article contend, the characterization influences 
both analyses, identifying precisely those statements that should be 
treated as opinions is essential. Moreover, risking circularity, the 
unique attributes of those statements that are classified as opinions 
should help guide how the elements of falsity and materiality apply 
to opinions. 
To answer these three questions, this Article draws on 
precedent developed in the contexts of common law fraud and 
defamation. Common-law fraud, defamation, and securities fraud 
share the same core allegation—the defendant made a false 
statement.29 The implications of being a statement of opinion differ 
somewhat in each context, but the precedent developed in the 
contexts of common law fraud and defamation is nonetheless 
instructive as courts struggle to address statements of opinion in 
the context of securities fraud. 
                                                                                                             
 28. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 29. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 552 U.S. at 157 (listing the elements of 
securities fraud as including a misrepresentation or omission of material fact); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (“One who fraudulently makes 
a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing 
another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability 
to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance 
upon the misrepresentation.” (emphasis added)); Id. § 538A (defining a 
misrepresentation of opinion for purposes of common law fraud); Id. § 558 (“To 
create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory 
statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; 
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) 
either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence 
of special harm caused by the publication.” (emphasis added)). See also Brief of 
Forbes LLC et al. as Amici Curiae at 28, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate 
Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1037), 2008 WL 2307442 
at *28 (“Indeed, in relevant substance, the SEC’s claim is very much like a 
defamation claim—it is brought to assess damages for inaccurate information 
just like a defamation claim is brought to impose liability for false speech.”). 
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Usually the allegedly false statements at the heart of securities 
fraud and defamation are made under different circumstances. In the 
paradigmatic securities fraud case, the speaker makes an unduly 
rosy statement about his or her business. By contrast, in the 
quintessential defamation case, the speaker makes an unduly 
derogatory statement about a third party or the third party’s 
products. Occasionally, however, securities fraud and defamation 
overlap. For example, public companies sometimes assert 
defamation claims against securities analysts and news 
organizations, contending that they have made unduly negative 
statements about the companies, thus harming the companies’ stock 
price.30 Occasionally, the companies allege that the speakers were 
motivated to increase the value of short positions in the companies’ 
stock or to increase the value of long positions in competitors’ stock, 
thus bringing the alleged defamation within the scope of the 
securities laws.31 
Similarly, although common-law fraud and securities fraud are 
both usually premised on unduly rosy statements, common law 
fraud class actions with respect to securities are usually preempted 
pursuant to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.32 
Therefore, as a practical matter, common law fraud is often 
focused on allegedly false statements about one’s products, while 
securities fraud is often focused on allegedly false statements about 
one’s business. Occasionally, however, large investors who need 
not resort to a class action assert common law fraud claims 
                                                                                                             
 30. E.g., Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 182–83 (4th Cir. 
1998) (A corporation asserted a defamation action against Forbes Magazine, 
alleging that a stock tip story contained false and defamatory statements about 
the corporation, causing the value of the company’s stock to plummet.); SPX 
Corp. v. Doe, 253 F. Supp. 2d 974, 974–77 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (A corporation 
asserted a defamation claim against an anonymous individual who posted 
negative comments about the corporation, such as “Strong Sell,” on a Yahoo! 
message board.). 
 31. E.g., Medifast, Inc. v. Minkow, No. 10-CV-382 JLS, 2011 WL 1157625, 
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2011) (“Plaintiffs . . . allege that Defendants engaged in a 
series of coordinated attacks on Medifast and the TSFL program designed to 
increase the value of a short position Defendants held in Medifast stock.”). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2006) (“No covered class action based upon the 
statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained 
in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging . . . that the defendant 
used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”); Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) (“SLUSA does 
not actually pre-empt any state cause of action. It simply denies plaintiffs the 
right to use the class-action device to vindicate certain claims.”). 
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premised on allegedly fraudulent conduct in connection with 
securities.33 
Recognizing that common law fraud and defamation share a 
core element—a false statement—with securities fraud, courts 
sometimes cite the precedent developed in these areas as 
persuasive authority in securities fraud cases. For example, in 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, a securities case, the 
Supreme Court cited Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,34 a 
defamation case, as persuasive authority about whether combining 
misleading statements with true statements neutralizes their 
deceptiveness.35 In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, another 
securities case, the Supreme Court cited “the common-law roots of 
the securities fraud action (and the common-law requirement that a 
plaintiff show actual damages)” in support of its holding that a 
plaintiff must prove loss causation.36 Just as common law fraud, 
defamation, and securities fraud share the same core allegation—
that the defendant made a false statement—they share the 
quandary of how to analyze statements of opinion.37  
III. WHAT IS AN OPINION FOR PURPOSES OF SECURITIES FRAUD AND 
DOES IT MATTER? 
This section answers two interrelated questions: (1) Should 
opinions be treated specially for purposes of falsity; and (2) if so, 
what is an opinion? First, Part A shows that most courts require an 
opinion to be both objectively and subjectively false in order to 
qualify as false for purposes of securities fraud and explains that 
this effectively raises the applicable scienter level for statements of 
opinion. Despite the concomitant necessity of distinguishing 
statements of opinion from statements of fact, as explained in Part 
B, courts do not apply a uniform test to make this distinction. Part 
C argues that, consistent with most courts having addressed this 
issue, an opinion is only false if it is both objectively and 
subjectively so. Finally, drawing from the dual falsity implication 
                                                                                                             
 33. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87 (“The Act does not deny any individual 
plaintiff, or indeed any group of fewer than 50 plaintiffs, the right to enforce any 
state-law cause of action that may exist.”). 
 34. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990). 
 35. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991). 
 36. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005). But see 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008) 
(“Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law.”). 
 37. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A (1977) (defining a 
misrepresentation of opinion for purposes of common law fraud); Id. § 566 
(1977) (explaining when a statement of opinion is actionable as defamatory). 
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and the comparable precedent in the contexts of defamation and 
common law fraud, Part D proposes the following evaluation–
inference test to differentiate statements of opinion from 
statements of fact: Does the statement express the speaker’s 
evaluation or inference of facts? 
A. Courts Treat Opinions Specially by Requiring Subjective Falsity 
Recognizing that a statement of opinion is potentially 
actionable as a misrepresentation of fact gives rise to a complex 
problem—how to prove the falsity of a statement of opinion. In 
contrast, proving the falsity of a statement of fact is relatively 
straightforward. For example, the statement that “the third 
quarter’s profits rose by 5%” would be false if the profits actually 
fell during that quarter. A statement of opinion, however, contains 
two embedded factual statements: (1) The speaker actually holds 
the opinion expressed, and (2) the opinion has a reasonable basis in 
fact. Which of these implicit factual statements must be false in 
order for the opinion to qualify as a misrepresentation? Courts 
addressing this issue commonly refer to the falsity of the implicit 
assertion that the speaker actually holds the opinion expressed as 
subjective falsity and the falsity of the implicit assertion that the 
opinion has a reasonable basis in fact as objective falsity.38  
In Virginia Bankshares, the Supreme Court held that subjective 
falsity alone—without objective falsity—is insufficient to establish 
that an opinion is false.39 The Court explained that allowing 
subjective falsity to suffice would open the floodgates by 
permitting litigation based merely on the “impurities” of an 
“unclean heart.”40 Moreover, the Court reasoned that this objective 
falsity requirement does not pose an undue burden on plaintiffs 
because, in most cases, subjective and objective falsity go hand in 
hand.41 A few lower courts, however, in apparent disregard of 
                                                                                                             
 38. E.g., In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1229 (S.D. 
Cal. 2010); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009); 
In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 39. Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1096. But see In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d 
at 47 (“Because the plaintiffs cannot clear the subjective falsity hurdle, we need 
not answer the thornier question of whether a plaintiff who challenges a 
statement of opinion also must plead facts sufficient to show, from an objective 
standpoint, that the statement either expressly or by fair implication contained a 
false or misleading assertion about its subject matter.”). 
 40. Id. Accord Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“This approach makes logical sense. Requiring plaintiffs to allege a speaker’s 
disbelief in, and the falsity of, the opinions or beliefs expressed ensures that 
their allegations concern the factual components of those statements.”). 
 41. Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1096. 
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Virginia Bankshares, have stated rules that would permit mere 
subjective falsity to establish an opinion’s falsity for purposes of 
securities fraud liability.42 
The Supreme Court’s Virginia Bankshares opinion did not 
explicitly address the converse issue—namely, whether objective 
falsity alone, without subjective falsity, is sufficient to establish 
that an opinion is false. However, Justice Scalia, concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment, interpreted the Court’s opinion as 
requiring both subjective and objective falsity: 
As I understand the Court’s opinion, the statement “In the 
opinion of the Directors, this is a high value for the shares” 
would produce liability if in fact it was not a high value and 
the directors knew that. It would not produce liability if in 
fact it was not a high value but the directors honestly 
believed otherwise.43 
Justice Scalia explained that, because the federal cause of 
action at issue “was never enacted by Congress, . . . the more 
narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more 
faithful we are to our task.”44 Indeed, consistent with Justice 
Scalia’s interpretation, most lower courts having explicitly 
addressed this issue interpret Virginia Bankshares as requiring a 
                                                                                                             
 42. In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(“A projection or statement of belief contains at least three implicit factual 
assertions: (1) that the statement is genuinely believed, (2) that there is a 
reasonable basis for that belief, and (3) that the speaker is not aware of any 
undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement. 
A projection or statement of belief may be actionable to the extent that one of 
these implied factual assertions is inaccurate.” (emphasis added)); In re XM 
Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 177 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(“Under the doctrine established by Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, . . . 
statements of opinion, if they are material, may be actionable if they are not 
actually believed when made, if there is no reasonable basis for them, or if the 
speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to undermine the 
statements’ accuracy.” (emphasis added)); In re Apollo Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 509 
F. Supp. 2d 837, 844 (D. Ariz. 2007) (characterizing the test as “disjunctive”); 
In re Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (stating that an opinion may be actionable if it “was without a basis in fact 
or the speakers were aware of facts undermining the positive statements” 
(emphasis added)); D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 741 
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (stating that the opinions at issue would be false if issued 
“without a genuine belief or reasonable basis”). 
 43. Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1108–09 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 1110 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190–92 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)). Justice Scalia is referring to his disapproval of 
implied private rights of action, such as the one that the Supreme Court 
recognized for breach of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in J.I. Case Co. 
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
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plaintiff to prove both objective and subjective falsity in order to 
establish that an opinion is false for purposes of securities fraud 
liability, albeit with little analysis.45 
B. The Subjective Falsity Requirement Raises the Applicable 
Scienter Level 
The subjective falsity requirement, when applied, effectively 
raises the applicable scienter level. Both subjective falsity and 
                                                                                                             
 45. E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d at 110 (“[W]hen a plaintiff 
asserts a claim under section 11 or 12 based upon a belief or opinion alleged to 
have been communicated by a defendant, liability lies only to the extent that the 
statement was both objectively false and disbelieved by the defendant at the time 
it was expressed.”); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“Because these fairness determinations are alleged to be misleading 
opinions, not statements of fact, they can give rise to a claim under section 11 
only if the complaint alleges with particularity that the statements were both 
objectively and subjectively false or misleading.”); Nolte v. Capital One Fin. 
Corp., 390 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2004) (“In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Sandberg, the Supreme Court held that in a securities fraud case, a statement of 
opinion may be a false factual statement if the statement is false, disbelieved by 
its maker, and related to matters of fact which can be verified by objective 
evidence.” (citations omitted)); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 
657, 670 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A statement of belief is only open to objection where 
the evidence shows that the speaker did not in fact hold that belief and the 
statement made asserted something false or misleading about the subject 
matter.” (emphasis added)); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(“[S]tatements which contain the speaker’s opinion are actionable under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the opinion 
and the opinion is not factually well-grounded.”); United States v. Causey, No. 
CRIM. H-05-025-SS, 2005 WL 2647976, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2005) 
(“Virginia Bankshares and its progeny establish that vague, conclusory 
statements are actionable when juxtaposed to allegations that they are false 
expressions of a corporate manager’s opinion or belief, they are misleading 
about their subject matter, and capable of proof by objective evidence of 
historical fact.”); In re Salomon Analyst AT&T Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 455, 465 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“It is well established that liability under section 10(b) can be 
predicated on statements of opinion, where it can be shown not merely that a 
proffered opinion was incorrect or doubtful, but that the speaker deliberately 
misrepresented his actual opinion.”); D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 
736 (“Material statements which contain the speaker’s opinion are actionable 
under Section 10(b) only if the speaker does not believe the opinion and the 
opinion is not factually well-grounded.”); Bond Opportunity Fund v. Unilab 
Corp., No. 99-Civ-11074, 2003 WL 21058251, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2003) 
(“Plaintiffs who charge that a statement of opinion, including a fairness opinion, 
is materially misleading, must allege ‘with particularity’ ‘provable facts’ to 
demonstrate that the statement of opinion is both objectively and subjectively 
false. Thus, the plaintiff must show both that the directors did not actually hold 
the belief or opinion stated, and that the opinion stated was in fact incorrect.” 
(citation omitted)). 
2013] OPINIONS ACTIONABLE 395 
 
 
 
scienter address the defendant’s state of mind when making the 
allegedly false statement.46 Judge Gerard E. Lynch in the Southern 
District of New York aptly explained the merger of subjective 
falsity and scienter into a single analysis as follows: 
Although in the typical case falsity and scienter are 
different elements, in a false statement of opinion case the 
two requirements are essentially identical. For example, in 
a case where a material misstatement of fact is alleged, the 
statement may be both objectively false and believed in 
good faith by the speaker to be true. However, in contrast, a 
material misstatement of opinion is by its nature a false 
statement, not about the objective world, but about the 
defendant’s own belief. Adequately alleging the falsity of a 
statement like “I believe AWE will grow” is the same as 
adequately alleging scienter on the part of the speaker, 
since the statement (unlike a statement of fact) cannot be 
false at all unless the speaker is knowingly misstating his 
truly held opinion.47 
This merger has four important impacts on the analysis of 
alleged misrepresentations of opinion: (1) The applicable scienter 
level for securities fraud is raised from recklessness to actual 
knowledge; (2) the subjective falsity pleading standard is 
influenced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s 
(PSLRA) strong inference pleading requirement; (3) the PSLRA’s 
special scienter standard for forward-looking statements is 
subsumed into the subjective falsity requirement; and (4) the 
subjective falsity requirement adds a “state of mind” element to 
securities claims without one. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 46. In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he subjective aspect of the falsity requirement and the scienter requirement 
essentially merge; the scienter analysis is subsumed by the analysis of subjective 
falsity.”); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (addressing subjective falsity) (“The issue of whether 
Moody’s believed the opinion will be addressed below in relation to the element 
of scienter.”); In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In analyzing whether DRD’s statements regarding the 
‘sustainability’ of the NWO and DRD’s ‘strong balance sheet’ were not 
sincerely held opinions and thus actionable misrepresentations, the ‘material 
misrepresentation’ requirement for pleading fraud essentially collapses into the 
scienter requirement.”). 
 47. In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 466. 
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1. The Applicable Scienter Level for Statements of Opinion Is 
Actual Knowledge 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet reached this issue,48 
the courts of appeals agree that the element of scienter with respect 
to alleged misrepresentations of fact is established if the defendant 
acted intentionally or recklessly.49 
In contrast, when analyzing whether an opinion is subjectively 
false, most courts require more than recklessness to establish 
subjective falsity.50 As Judge Lynch explained:  
It is not sufficient for these purposes to allege that an 
opinion was unreasonable, irrational, excessively 
optimistic, not borne out by subsequent events, or any other 
characterization that relies on hindsight or falls short of an 
identifiable gap between the opinion publicly expressed 
and the opinion truly held.51  
Other courts have described this subjective falsity requirement in 
similar terms: disbelief of the opinion expressed;52 deliberate 
                                                                                                             
 48. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011) 
(“We have not decided whether recklessness suffices to fulfill the scienter 
requirement.”). 
 49. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 
(2007) (“Every Court of Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a 
plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by showing that the defendant acted 
intentionally or recklessly.”). 
 50. See In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 757 F. 
Supp. 2d 260, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Although there is some disagreement 
among the district courts in this Circuit as to whether recklessness can satisfy 
the subjective falsity requirement, the prevailing conclusion is that a plaintiff 
must allege that the defendant did not actually believe the stated opinion.”). But 
see In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (after merging the 
subjective falsity and scienter analyses, applying the recklessness standard); In 
re DRDGold Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d at 571–73 (after collapsing the subjective 
falsity analysis into the scienter analysis, analyzing whether the plaintiffs’ 
allegations gave rise to a “strong inference of recklessness”); D.E. & J Ltd. 
P’ship, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (applying the “knowledge” or “reckless 
disregard” test to determine if an auditor’s opinion was made “without a genuine 
belief”). 
 51. In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 466. 
 52. Broderick v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, 169 F. App’x 496, 499 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“There was no materially false or misleading statement: PHP 
qualified its remarks with words such as ‘believes,’ ‘Company’s . . . 
interpretation’ and ‘in management’s opinion.’ Plaintiffs do not allege that the 
company did not in fact hold such beliefs at the time that the statement was 
made.”); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“A plaintiff can challenge a statement of opinion by pleading facts sufficient to 
indicate that the speaker did not actually hold the opinion expressed (throughout 
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misrepresentation of a truly held opinion;53 knowing misstatement 
of a truly held opinion;54 knowing falsity;55 and actual 
knowledge.56 Regardless of the terminology used, however, this 
subjective falsity requirement requires more than mere 
recklessness. 
Because the subjective falsity requirement is more stringent 
than the ordinary scienter requirement, the merger of these two 
analyses when the alleged misrepresentation is a statement of 
opinion has the effect of raising the applicable scienter level.57 In 
other words, when the alleged misrepresentation is a statement of 
opinion, the applicable scienter level is raised from recklessness to 
actual disbelief or actual knowledge of falsity.58  
                                                                                                             
 
this opinion, we refer to such allegations as claims of ‘subjective falsity’).”); 
Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-1185-WSD, 
2010 WL 3545389, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010) (“Absent an allegation that 
Defendants did not believe the statements incorporated into the RS/P, Plaintiff 
has not stated a claim for misstatements relating to SunTrust’s opinion regarding 
the adequacy of its loan reserves.”); Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 350 F. 
Supp. 2d 375, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing a securities fraud claim 
premised on an analyst’s “buy” rating where the plaintiff failed to allege 
sufficient evidence that “he did not subjectively believe the opinion he was 
propounding in his analyst reports”). 
 53. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 
753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 182 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010) (“[A statement of opinion] is 
only actionable if ‘defendants deliberately misrepresented a truly held opinion.’” 
(quoting Podany, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 153–54)); Podany, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 153–
54 (“The sine qua non of a securities fraud claim based on false opinion is that 
defendants deliberately misrepresented a truly held opinion.”). 
 54. In re Salomon Analyst, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 466 (explaining that an 
opinion “cannot be false at all unless the speaker is knowingly misstating his 
truly held opinion”). 
 55. In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d at 49 (“The plaintiff must . . . point to 
provable facts that strongly suggest knowing falsity.”); In re Bank of Am. Corp., 
757 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (analyzing the subjective falsity of opinions by applying 
a knowingly false standard). 
 56. In re Bank of Am. Corp., 757 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (“[The actual 
knowledge standard for subjective falsity] comports with the Supreme Court’s 
view in Virginia Bankshares that statements of belief are statements of fact in 
the sense that they convey that the speaker ‘do[es] act for the reasons given or 
hold the belief stated,’ and that such statements may be attacked by 
‘circumstantial evidence bearing on the facts that would reasonably underlie the 
reasons claimed and the honesty of any statement’ regarding those reasons.” 
(quoting Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092–93 (1991))). 
 57. Wendy Gerwick Couture, Price Fraud, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 64 (2011) 
(“[T]he falsity and scienter elements converge when an opinion is the basis of a 
securities fraud claim, effectively raising the scienter level to knowledge.”). 
 58. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud, 78 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26, 
28–29 (2006) (noting a similar convergence between the falsity and scienter 
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2. The Strong Inference of Scienter Pleading Standard Informs 
Whether Subjective Falsity Is Pleaded Adequately 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) impose heightened pleading 
standards on claims for securities fraud.59 With respect to the 
falsity element, the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) require that falsity be 
pleaded with particularity.60 With respect to the element of 
scienter, the PSLRA requires a plaintiff to plead facts giving rise to 
a “strong inference” of scienter.61 As the Supreme Court explained, 
a “complaint will survive . . . only if a reasonable person would 
deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as 
any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”62 
When these heightened pleading standards are applied to 
allegedly fraudulent opinions, the pleading standards for falsity 
and scienter merge.63 In other words, the precedent developed in 
the context of pleading the strong inference of scienter informs 
whether a plaintiff has adequately pleaded the element of 
subjective falsity.64 Therefore, a complaint will survive dismissal 
                                                                                                             
 
elements in the context of promissory fraud) (“Courts reason that a promisor 
cannot be mistaken about his or her own intent. Thus if the defendant didn’t 
intend to perform [thus rendering his implied representation of the intent to 
perform false], the misrepresentation must have been a knowing one, and hence 
there is no need for separate proof of scienter.”). 
 59. The PSLRA applies “in each private action arising under this chapter 
that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2006). Rule 9(b) applies to all civil actions 
asserting fraud and filed in federal court. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 9(b). 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2006) (“[T]he complaint shall specify . . . the 
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“[A] 
party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . .”). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2011). By contrast, Rule 9(b) does 
not require that the element of scienter be pleaded with particularity: “Malice, 
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged 
generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 62. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007). 
 63. E.g., In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., 757 
F. Supp. 2d 260, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Thus, the PSLRA’s requirement that a 
plaintiff must plead ‘with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that 
the defendant acted with the required state of mind,’ applies to the Derivative 
Plaintiffs’ claim that the BofA Directors’ opinion was false or misleading.” 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2))); In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 
F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he plaintiff must, for each allegedly false 
opinion, plead provable facts strongly suggesting that the speaker did not believe 
that particular opinion to be true when uttered.”). 
 64. In re Credit Suisse, 431 F.3d at 48 (“Because subjective falsity is so 
intricately tied to scienter in false opinion cases, the authorities relative to 
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only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of the 
speakers’ disbelief in the expressed opinion “cogent and at least as 
compelling as any opposing inference . . . .”65 
3. The PSLRA’s Actual Knowledge Requirement for Forward-
Looking Statements Subsumes the Subjective Falsity 
Requirement 
The PSLRA affords safe harbor protection to a forward-
looking statement if “the plaintiff fails to prove that [it] . . . was 
made with actual knowledge . . . that the statement was false or 
misleading.”66 Like the subjective falsity requirement, the safe 
harbor has the effect of raising the applicable scienter level from 
recklessness to knowledge.67 The safe harbor protection was 
enacted in order to counteract “[t]he muzzling effect of abusive 
securities litigation.”68 As the Joint Explanatory Statement of the 
Conference Committee explained, “Fear that inaccurate projections 
will trigger the filing of securities class action lawsuit[s] has 
muzzled corporate management.”69 The safe harbor protection, by 
raising the bar for a plaintiff to survive dismissal and to prevail on 
the merits, seeks to encourage companies to share predictions with 
the public, thereby enhancing market efficiency.70  
Forward-looking statements are quintessential opinions. As 
defined in the statute, a forward-looking statement is essentially a 
prediction.71 And indeed, absent a crystal ball, any prediction is 
necessarily subjective, requiring the speaker to infer an unknown 
fact (i.e., the future) from a known set of facts (i.e., the present).72  
                                                                                                             
 
pleading scienter are instructive (although not necessarily controlling) when 
determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied his or her pleading burden with 
respect to the subjective aspect of the falsity claim.”). 
 65. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 324. 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (2006).  
 67. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 68. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741. 
 69. Id. at 742. 
 70. Id. (“The Conference Committee has adopted a statutory ‘safe harbor’ to 
enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forward-
looking information.”). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (2006). See also Wendy Gerwick Couture, 
Mixed Statements: The Safe Harbor’s Rocky Shore, 39 SEC. REG. L.J. 257, 260 
(2011) (“The common element in this definitional list is the requirement that the 
statement refer to a future, as opposed to a present or past, state of affairs.”). 
 72. See infra Part III.E.3. 
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Therefore, both the PSLRA safe harbor and the subjective 
falsity requirement apply to forward-looking statements. These two 
standards are virtually identical.73 As such, the PSLRA’s actual 
knowledge requirement effectively subsumes the subjective falsity 
requirement for a subset of opinions—namely, predictions. 
4. The Subjective Falsity Requirement Adds a Scienter Element 
to Securities Claims Without One 
The subjective falsity requirement, if applied to securities 
claims under §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, injects a 
scienter requirement into otherwise strict liability claims. Section 
11 imposes strict liability on certain parties, including issuers and 
underwriters, for false or misleading statements in registration 
statements,74 and § 12(a)(2) imposes strict liability on sellers for 
false or misleading statements in prospectuses and other offering 
communications.75 Section 11 affords nonissuer defendants a due 
diligence defense,76 and § 12(a)(2) affords defendants a reasonable 
care defense77—which have the effect of imposing a negligence-
like state of mind requirement on defendants.78 Even so, however, 
plaintiffs are not required to prove scienter.79  
The subjective falsity requirement, when applied to §§ 11 and 
12(a)(2) claims premised on opinions, effectively imports a 
scienter element into these claims.80 One commentator has argued 
                                                                                                             
 73. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
 75. Id. § 77l(a)(2). 
 76. Id. § 77k(b). 
 77. Id. § 77l(a)(2). 
 78. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976) (characterizing 
the § 11 due diligence defense) (“In effect, this is a negligence standard.”); In re 
Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“[S]ection 11’s ‘reasonable investigation’ standard is similar, if not identical, to 
section 12(2)’s ‘reasonable care’ standard.”). 
 79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009) (defining scienter as 
“[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the 
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done 
knowingly” or “[a] mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud”). 
 80. E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“[W]hen a plaintiff asserts a claim under section 11 or 12 based upon a belief or 
opinion alleged to have been communicated by a defendant, liability lies only to 
the extent that the statement was both objectively false and disbelieved by the 
defendant at the time it was expressed.”); Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp Ltd., 551 
F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Because these fairness determinations are 
alleged to be misleading opinions, not statements of fact, they can give rise to a 
claim under section 11 only if the complaint alleges with particularity that the 
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that the subjective falsity requirement therefore “contravenes 
congressional intent to lessen the burdens of proof under the 
securities laws, because it essentially incorporates the equivalent of 
a scienter burden.”81 
C. Courts Do Not Apply a Uniform Test to Distinguish Statements 
of Fact and Statements of Opinion in Securities Fraud Cases 
Despite the necessity of distinguishing between statements of 
fact and statements of opinion in order to assess whether the 
plaintiff must plead and prove subjective falsity, courts do not 
apply a uniform test to make this distinction in securities fraud 
cases. 
1. The I Know It When I See It Test 
First, a number of courts seem to apply an I know it when I see 
it test, merely characterizing certain statements as opinions without 
articulating a rationale. For example, in Plumbers’ Union Local 
No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co.,82 the court 
characterized the statement that “Swiss Re’s sub-prime-related 
activities outside its invested assets had ‘significantly less risk than 
the risk that [Swiss Re was] exposed to through the investment that 
[it had] made recently in sub-prime bonds’” as a statement of 
opinion because “a statement of relative risk is a statement of 
opinion.”83 Similarly, in In re DRDGold Ltd. Securities 
Litigation,84 the court concluded that statements about the 
“sustainability” of restructuring and a “‘strong balance sheet’ 
appear to be more properly characterized as optimistic statements 
of opinion as opposed to fact.”85 
 
                                                                                                             
 
statements were both objectively and subjectively false or misleading.”). But see 
Fait, 655 F.3d at 112 n.5 (“Contrary to plaintiff’s concern, the standard applied 
here does not amount to a requirement of scienter. We do not view a 
requirement that a plaintiff plausibly allege that defendant misstated his truly 
held belief and an allegation that defendant did so with fraudulent intent as one 
and the same.”). 
 81. John S. Poole, Improving the Reliability of Management Forecasts, 14 
J. CORP. L. 547, 570 (1989). 
 82. 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 83. Id. at 182 (alterations in original). 
 84. 472 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 85. Id. at 569. 
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2. The Literal Test 
Other courts applying a literal test give great weight to the 
inclusion of phrases like “I think,” “I believe,” and “in my 
opinion” when analyzing whether an alleged misrepresentation is a 
statement of opinion or fact, apparently without regard to the 
substance of the representation following that phrase.86 For 
instance, in Broderick v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP,87 the court 
noted that the defendant “qualified its remarks with words such as 
‘believes,’ ‘Company’s . . . interpretation’ and ‘in management’s 
opinion.’”88 Similarly, in Malin v. XL Capital Ltd.,89 the court used 
italics to highlight certain phrases that indicated the statements’ 
status as opinion: 
The language used by Defendants—e.g., XL “believes” the 
reserves are sufficient, “we think we’ve turned a corner 
now,” “I believe we are in an unencumbered position to 
move forward,” “we believe, given all the facts we know 
today, it is at the right reserve levels,” and the Company 
“believes the methods presently adopted [for estimating 
loss reserves] provide a reasonably objective result”—
qualifies the statements and indicates their status as 
opinions, rather than guarantees.90 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 86. E.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 312 F. Supp. 2d 549, 557 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Typical of the statements challenged by Plaintiffs is Lane’s 
statement on a conference call with Wall Street analysts following the 
announcement of the Company’s investment in ImClone Systems that ‘we think 
that this is a tremendous strategic opportunity. We think [Erbitux] is real 
blockbuster potential, has the potential to be one of the most exciting, if not the 
most exciting, oncology compound introduced over the next several years . . . 
[a]nd it’s a compound with an 18-year patent life, ready to go to market 
hopefully next year.’” (alterations in original)); D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship v. 
Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 736 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“The full text makes 
clear that the statements which Plaintiffs contend are false are statements of 
opinion. (‘We believe that these financial statements reasonably present our 
financial position and results of operations’; ‘we maintain comprehensive 
systems of internal controls [which] we believe provide . . . reasonable 
assurance [that asset [sic] are safeguarded and transactions are executed in 
accordance with established procedures].’)” (alterations in original)). 
 87. 169 F. App’x 496 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 88. Id. at 499. 
 89. 499 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 90. Id. at 144 (alteration in original). 
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3. The Judgment or Subjectivity Test 
Finally, a number of courts engage in a more nuanced analysis, 
characterizing opinions as statements that involve judgment or 
subjectivity. For example, as the First Circuit explained, most 
stock analysts’ ratings are statements of opinion because “[a]rmed 
with the same background facts, two knowledgeable analysts, each 
acting in the utmost good faith, could well assign different ratings 
to the same stock.”91 Similarly, a number of courts have juxtaposed 
statements of objective or verifiable fact with those of subjective 
opinion.92 According to these courts, statements about the source 
of information,93 the amount of sales in the past quarter,94 the 
firm’s market capitalization,95 an executive’s promotion,96 the 
firm’s provision of certain types of telephone and Internet 
service,97 and the liquidity of an investment98 are statements of 
objective fact. In contrast, statements about the adequacy of 
                                                                                                             
 91. In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“Most ratings are, therefore, best understood as statements of opinion, not as 
unadulterated statements of objective fact.”). 
 92. E.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he statements regarding goodwill at issue here are subjective ones rather 
than ‘objective factual matters.’”). 
 93. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 240 n.11 
(4th Cir. 2009) (“Claims regarding the source of information are not expressions 
of subjective opinion, but are representations of an objectively verifiable fact.”). 
 94. In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251–52 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“‘Facts’ about a company include data like amount of sales in 
a past quarter or the firm’s market capitalization on a given date (closing price 
of the stock multiplied by number of shares outstanding), or events like an 
executive’s promotion to CEO or the acquisition of a competitor.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 183 (D.R.I. 2003) (“The next 
subset of alleged fraud essentially concerns one statement that was repeated at 
the bottom of various 1999 press releases: ‘[LOA] is a . . . “CLEC” and . . . 
“IISP” providing local dial-tone, instate toll, long distance, high-speed Internet 
access and cable programming solutions . . . .’”) (“The statement is a 
representation of present and verifiable fact—LOA marketed itself and may 
have attracted investors because it represented itself as a company that could 
provide and was providing these services. If it could not or was not providing 
these services at the time it issued these statements, it may have committed 
actionable fraud.”). 
 98. Owens v. Gaffken & Barriger Fund, LLC, No. 08-Civ-8414, 2009 WL 
3073338, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2009) (“The alleged misrepresentations 
concerning the liquid nature of the investment and the plaintiff’s easy access to 
cash withdrawal cannot be couched as a matter of opinion or optimism, but 
rather, were concrete representations concerning the Fund’s purpose and 
function.”). 
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reserves for predicted loan losses99 and valuation models100 are 
statements of subjective opinion. Finally, a number of courts have 
cited the exercise of professional judgment—such as that of an 
auditor or a ratings agency—as a hallmark of an opinion.101  
D. The Falsity of an Opinion Is Established Only if It Is Both 
Objectively and Subjectively False 
This Article agrees with the majority of courts having 
addressed this issue that, for an opinion to be false, it must be both 
subjectively and objectively false, not merely objectively false.102 
First, this dual-falsity requirement recognizes that an opinion, 
in addition to conveying something objective, conveys something 
subjective—the speaker’s mental processes. This “something 
special” that opinions convey is recognized in a variety of other 
contexts in the law. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
recognize that opinions are unique. Rule 701 limits the 
admissibility of opinion testimony of lay witnesses to those that are 
“helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to 
                                                                                                             
 99. Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1185, 
2010 WL 3545389, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010) (“Whether SunTrust had 
adequate reserves for its predicted loan losses generally is not a matter of 
objective fact, but rather a statement of SunTrust’s opinion regarding what 
portion of its loan portfolio would be uncollectable.”). 
 100. In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251–52 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“First, the Court rejects plaintiffs’ characterization of 
valuation models as ‘fact’ rather than ‘opinion.’ . . . In contrast to these objective 
statements, financial valuation models depend so heavily on the discretionary 
choices of the modeler-including choice of method (e.g., discounted cash flow 
vs. market-based methods), choice of assumptions (such as the proper discount 
rate or cost of capital for a particular firm or industry), and choice of 
‘comparables’ that the resulting models and their predictions can only fairly be 
characterized a subjective opinions.”). 
 101. In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (“There is no dispute that, even as described in the 
complaint, the ratings that Moody’s assigned to the notes ultimately represented 
Moody’s own judgment or opinion about the quality of the bond.”); Payne v. 
DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547, 580 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (“In allegations based on the 
defendant’s violation of GAAP, the plaintiff must show ‘that the accounting 
judgments which were made were such that no reasonable accountant would 
have made the same decision if confronted with the same facts.’” (quoting In re 
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994))); D.E. & J 
Ltd. P’ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“The 
opinion rule discussed above is particularly applicable with respect to opinions 
by auditors, which generally involve issues such as the auditor’s dependence on 
information supplied by the client, application of complex accounting and 
auditing standards, and varying degrees of professional judgment.”). 
 102. See supra Part III.A. 
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determining a fact in issue.”103 This limitation recognizes that 
opinion lay testimony has something special to it—which can be 
invaluable to a jury, such as when it interprets evidence that the 
jury would not otherwise fully understand, and which also can 
infringe on the jury’s fact-finding function, such as when it is 
offered “in lieu of the individual components of perception.”104 As 
another example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
prohibit attorneys from “knowingly . . . mak[ing] a false statement 
of material fact . . . to a third person,”105 and the comments 
distinguish between these prohibited factual misstatements and 
opinions—like “[e]stimates of price or value placed on the subject 
of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable 
settlement of a claim”—that are not within the scope of the 
prohibition.106 
Second, this dual falsity requirement recognizes that this 
“something special” about opinions enhances market efficiency, 
thus meriting the heightened protection that the subjective falsity 
requirement affords. The dissemination of opinions about 
securities is a valuable way to enhance market efficiency. For 
example, the Supreme Court has characterized securities analysis 
as “necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”107 
Congress, also recognizing the importance of securities analysis to 
capital-raising, recently enacted the JOBS Act, which lifts 
restrictions on securities analyst coverage of “emerging growth 
compan[ies].”108 When enacting the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress 
similarly recognized that credit rating agencies, which play a 
gatekeeper role similar to that of securities analysts, are “central to 
                                                                                                             
 103. FED. R. EVID. 701. 
 104. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6255 (1997). 
 105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2010). 
 106. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2010). 
 107. Dirks v. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983); id. at 657 
n.17 (quoting the SEC’s briefing) (“The SEC expressly recognized that ‘[t]he 
value to the entire market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; market 
efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out 
and analyze information, and thus the analyst’s work redounds to the benefit of 
all investors.’” (alterations in original)). 
 108. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (The JOBS Act) § 105(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78o-6(c) (Westlaw 2012) (prohibiting certain restrictions on 
communications between securities analysts and potential investors and on 
communications among analysts, company management, and investment 
banking personnel); H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 6 (2012), reprinted in 2012 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 278, 279 (“H.R. 3606 also improves the flow of information about 
EGCs [Emerging Growth Companies] to investors by removing burdensome and 
outdated restrictions on communications between companies, research analysts, 
and investors.”). 
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capital formation, investor confidence, and the efficient 
performance of the United States economy.”109 Finally, the unique 
insights of companies and their officers and directors are essential 
to market efficiency. Indeed, when enacting the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, Congress explicitly recognized the 
importance of a company’s expression of its opinions about the 
future of its business in achieving market efficiency.110 Yet, if an 
honestly expressed opinion were potentially actionable merely 
because, after the fact, it were deemed unreasonable, voluntary 
expression of opinions would be stifled. Thus, just as the PSLRA 
affords safe harbor protection to forward-looking statements in 
order to encourage companies to share their opinions about the 
future,111 the subjective falsity requirement lessens the self-
censorship of these valuable communications. 
Indeed, the contention that opinions should be treated specially 
in the context of securities fraud draws on the work of numerous 
eminent scholars who, recognizing that courts struggle mightily 
when applying the elements of securities fraud to statements other 
than “plain vanilla” statements of fact, have identified various 
subsets of statements and proposed analytical frameworks that 
should apply to those subsets. None of these scholars has focused 
specifically on statements of opinion. Yet, a close analysis of their 
proposed subsets shows that they intersect around statements of 
opinion. For example, Professor Jennifer O’Hare, noting courts’ 
inconsistent application of the puffery defense to (1) vague forward-
looking statements and (2) vague statements characterizing present 
facts, has proposed a framework to analyze the materiality of these 
statements.112 Professor Donald C. Langevoort has identified courts’ 
inconsistent treatment of half-truths and proposed a framework for 
assessing whether half-truths should be actionable as securities 
fraud.113 Professor David A. Hoffman has proposed a new presumed 
liability regime to apply to so-called puffery, which he identifies in 
                                                                                                             
 109. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 931(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 110. H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 742 (“The Conference Committee has adopted a statutory ‘safe harbor’ to 
enhance market efficiency by encouraging companies to disclose forward-
looking information.”). 
 111. Id. at 731 (“And it establishes a safe harbor for forward looking 
statements, to encourage issuers to disseminate relevant information to the 
market without fear of open-ended liability.”). 
 112. O’Hare, supra note 12, at 1709, 1737. 
 113. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 88, 113. 
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the securities context as “vague statement[s] of corporate 
optimism” about the future or about current conditions.114 
Therefore, this Article contends that the “specialness” of 
opinions should be reflected in the dual-falsity requirement, which 
mandates that an opinion is not false unless both objectively and 
subjectively so. In other words, the special part of an opinion—the 
speaker’s mental processes—must be misrepresented in order for 
an opinion to be false. Of course, this Article’s recommendation 
presupposes that one can identify that subset of statements—
namely, opinions—that merit this “special” treatment. Indeed, as 
discussed below, the dual falsity implication of being classified as 
an opinion should help guide the creation of the standard to 
identify statements of opinion.  
E. Courts Should Apply the Novel Evaluation–Inference Test to 
Identify Statements of Opinion 
The issue of whether an opinion must be objectively and 
subjectively false is interrelated with the issue of how to identify 
an opinion. Underlying the dual-falsity requirement is the 
recognition that opinions have “something special” about them—
the mental processes of the speaker. The key to identifying 
statements of opinion is identifying what exactly is special about 
them. To place a finger on this specialness, this Part first draws 
guidance from the same quandary in the contexts of defamation 
and common law fraud. Then, this Part proposes that an opinion 
for purposes of securities fraud is a statement requiring evaluation 
or inference. In particular, this Part proposes the following 
evaluation–inference test to differentiate statements of fact from 
statements of opinion for securities fraud purposes: Does the 
statement express the speaker’s evaluation or inference of facts? 
Finally, this Part explains how this test dovetails with the dual-
falsity requirement and compares this test to the current tests that 
courts apply in the contexts of defamation, common law fraud, and 
securities fraud. 
1. The Fact–Opinion Distinction in the Defamation Context 
The fact–opinion distinction was once paramount in the law of 
defamation, with courts and commentators interpreting Supreme 
Court precedent as holding that statements of opinion may not be 
                                                                                                             
 114. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 1405–11, 1445. 
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actionable because they are protected by the First Amendment.115 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,116 however, the Supreme 
Court rejected the contention that the fact–opinion distinction is 
determinative of First Amendment protection: “[W]e think the 
‘breathing space’ which ‘[f]reedoms of expression require in order 
to survive’ is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine 
without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between ‘opinion’ 
and fact.”117 Although the fact–opinion distinction is no longer 
outcome determinative in defamation cases, the scholarship that 
developed around this issue is nonetheless instructive when 
analyzing this issue in the securities fraud context. 
One of the most influential scholars in this area, Dean W. Page 
Keeton, divided opinions into two categories—evaluative and 
deductive.118 Subsequent scholars have adopted these categories 
when discussing the scope of common law defamation and the 
scope of First Amendment protection of opinions.119 In an 
evaluative opinion, “the speaker makes a normative judgment 
based on facts known” to the speaker.120 In a deductive opinion, 
the speaker applies his or her “deductive skills” to a body of facts, 
thereby “lead[ing] to the inference of a new fact.”121 By 
                                                                                                             
 115. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“We 
begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such 
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for 
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition 
of other ideas.”). 
 116. 497 U.S. 1 (1990). 
 117. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)). 
 118. W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. 
REV. 1221, 1233 (1976) (“A deductive opinion could be characterized as an 
imputation of past misconduct or purportedly existing fact, drawn as an 
inference from the existence of other facts. By contrast, an evaluative opinion is 
simply a condemnation of the defendant for having committed certain 
conduct.”); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §113A 
(5th ed. 1984). Dean Keeton made the additional distinction between opinions 
that do not imply any facts and those that do. Id. This distinction is not 
instructive on the fact–opinion issue, but it is instructive on the materiality issue 
addressed below in Part IV.C.5 and is addressed further there. 
 119. Joseph H. King, Defamation Claims Based on Parody and Other 
Fanciful Communications Not Intended to Be Understood As Fact, 2008 UTAH 
L. REV. 875, 901–02 (2008); Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of Opinion: 
Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 473–75 (1994); 
Ronald K. Chen, Once More into the Breach: Fact Versus Opinion Revisited 
After Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 1 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 331, 334–37 
(1991). 
 120. Chen, supra note 119, at 334–35. 
 121. Id. at 335. Notably, Dean Keeton’s usage of the term deductive opinion, 
which is premised on inferring an unknown fact from known facts, differs from 
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implication, Dean Keeton’s categories limit the scope of 
statements that are as classified as opinions to those that involve 
either evaluation or inference. 
2. The Fact–Opinion Distinction in the Common-Law Fraud 
Context 
In the common law fraud context, as articulated in the Second 
Restatement of Torts, opinions are defined quite broadly: “A 
representation is one of opinion if it expresses only (a) the belief of 
the maker, without certainty, as to the existence of a fact; or (b) his 
judgment as to quality, value, authenticity, or other matters of 
judgment.”122 The Restatement definition has been widely cited by 
courts struggling to differentiate between statements of fact and of 
opinion in misrepresentation cases.123 
Part (b) of the Restatement definition bears a close resemblance 
to Dean Keeton’s evaluative opinion classification. The 
Restatement cites the statement that “an automobile is a good car” 
as an example because “it is a matter upon which individual 
judgments may be expected to differ.”124 Like Dean Keeton’s 
evaluative opinion classification, the description of an automobile 
as “good” is an evaluation drawn from facts known to the speaker. 
Part (a) of the Restatement test also bears a close resemblance 
to Dean Keeton’s deductive opinion classification. Like Dean 
Keeton’s classification, Part (a) includes a speaker’s inferences 
about the existence of facts, drawn from the speaker’s analysis of 
facts known to the speaker. 
In one key area, however, Part (a) of the Restatement definition 
sweeps more broadly than Dean Keeton’s deductive opinion 
classification. Part (a) includes qualified statements of fact, even if 
the speaker is not inferring the stated facts. Take as an example a 
forgetful speaker who, unable to remember the acreage of a parcel 
of land, states, “I believe that there are ten acres here.” This 
                                                                                                             
 
the social science definition of deductive reasoning, which is premised on 
determining a valid conclusion from true premises. See P. N. Johnson-Laird, 
Deductive Reasoning, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 109, 110 (1999) (“By definition, 
deduction yields valid conclusions, which must be true given that their premises 
are true . . . .”). 
 122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A (1977). 
 123. E.g., Marino v. United Bank of Ill., N.A., 484 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ill. App. 
1985); McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp., 650 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1995); Consol. Papers, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 451 N.W.2d 456, 459 
(Wisc. Ct. App. 1989). 
 124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. b (1977). 
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statement, which expresses the speaker’s belief, without certainty, 
about the existence of fact would fall squarely within Part (a) of 
the definition.125 Yet, this qualified statement of fact, which 
represents neither the speaker’s evaluation nor inference, would 
fall outside the scope of Dean Keeton’s classifications. 
3. In the Context of Securities Fraud, an Opinion Requires the 
Exercise of Evaluation or Inference 
Drawing from these comparable distinctions in the contexts of 
defamation and common law fraud, this Article argues that, for 
purposes of securities fraud, opinions should be defined as 
statements requiring the speaker’s evaluation or inference. A 
statement of evaluation expresses the speaker’s judgment as to 
quality, value, or other matters of judgment. As an example, a 
CEO’s statement that “our high-tech division is uniquely 
positioned to take over the market share abandoned by X 
company” would qualify as an opinion because the CEO exercised 
independent judgment in order to evaluate the division’s position. 
A statement of inference expresses the speaker’s inference about 
the existence of a fact, based on the speaker’s analysis of other 
data. As an example, a CEO’s statement, “I think that our 
competitors are expending fewer resources than we are on research 
and development,” would qualify as an opinion, assuming that the 
competitors’ R&D budgets were not public, because the CEO 
inferred the statement’s substance. 
a. The Importance of the Opinion Characterization 
This test identifies the “something special” that makes applying 
the elements of securities fraud to statements of opinion so tricky. 
As discussed above, several prominent scholars have identified 
various subsets of statements and proposed analytical frameworks 
that should apply to those subsets.126 None of those scholars has 
focused specifically on statements of opinion, yet statements of 
evaluation or inference are at the heart of these scholars’ subsets. 
                                                                                                             
 125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. c (1977) (“The form of 
the statement is important and may be controlling. ‘I believe that there are ten 
acres here,’ is a different statement, in what it conveys, from ‘The area of this 
land is ten acres.’ The one conveys an expression of some doubt while the other 
leaves no room for it.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. b 
(1977) (“The difference is one between ‘This is true,’ and ‘I think this is true, 
but I am not sure.’”). 
 126. See supra Part III.D. 
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Professor O’Hare’s forward-looking statements,127 Professor 
Langevoort’s predictive “half-truths,”128 and Professor Hoffman’s 
vague statements of corporate optimism about the future—all of 
which necessarily require the speaker to infer an unknown fact (the 
future) from known facts—are quintessential opinions. Similarly, 
Professor O’Hare’s “vague statements characterizing present facts” 
and Professor Hoffman’s vague statements of corporate optimism 
about the present include evaluative statements of opinion.129 
b. Comparison to Tests Currently Applied in Securities Fraud 
Cases 
This evaluation–inference test is preferable to the I know it 
when I see it approach that some courts apply because it is capable 
of repetition. A uniform and predictable test is imperative so that 
corporate actors are not afraid to speak, lest they inadvertently 
subject themselves to liability. 
Moreover, this evaluation–inference test is better than merely 
relying on phrases like “I think” and “in my opinion” because it 
elevates substance over form. For example, under the proposed 
test, both of the following two statements would be treated as 
opinions: (1) “I believe that the company is well-poised to capture 
the additional market share vacated by Borders”; and (2) “the 
company is well-poised to capture the additional market share 
vacated by Borders.” The assessment about the company’s ability 
to capture additional market share incorporates the speaker’s 
judgment, regardless of whether it is preceded by the phrase “I 
believe.” The phrase “I believe” is merely implied in the second 
                                                                                                             
 127. See O’Hare, supra note 12, at 1709 (citing In re Storage Tech. Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (D. Colo. 1992)) (referencing a company’s 
prediction that a product would be a “blowout winner” as an example of a 
vague, forward-looking statement). Because it was uncertain whether the 
product would indeed be a success, the company’s prediction, drawn from 
known facts about the product, constituted a deductive opinion. 
 128. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 116 (citing a company’s release of a 
projection, without also disclosing that that the company is also considering 
more pessimistic projections internally, as an example of a half-truth). 
 129. See O’Hare, supra note 12, at 1713 n.95 (citing Searls v. Glasser, 64 
F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 1995)) (referencing a company’s statement that it was 
“recession-resistant” as an example of a “vague statement [] of present facts”). 
This statement, which expresses a company’s subjective evaluation drawn from 
known facts about the company, is an evaluative opinion. See also Hoffman, 
supra note 14, at 1410 n.84–85 (citing examples of puffing statements about 
current conditions). 
412 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
statement.130 The converse is also true. Neither of the following 
two statements, made by the chairman of the board of directors, 
would be treated as an opinion: (1) “The board met for three hours 
before voting on the merger”; and (2) “I believe that the board met 
for three hours before voting on the merger.” The mere addition of 
the qualifying phrase “I believe” would not transform a statement 
of fact, which was neither inferred nor evaluative, into a statement 
of opinion. 
Further, the evaluation–inference test is consistent with the 
more nuanced analyses applied by courts such as the First Circuit, 
which requires that opinions involve judgment or subjectivity.131 
Like those courts, the evaluation–inference test recognizes that the 
special treatment afforded opinions—including specialized falsity 
and materiality analyses—is only appropriate if the statement is 
special. The speaker’s independent evaluation or inference is the 
added value. In other words, the speaker’s evaluation or inference 
might differ from another’s, even if the other were presented with 
the same background facts from which to reach an evaluation or an 
inference, and it is that “something special” that makes the 
statement an opinion.132  
Applying the evaluation–inference test to those statements that 
courts have classified as opinions in securities cases demonstrates 
that most statements that courts have classified as opinions are 
within the scope of the evaluation–inference test, despite the 
disparate tests that courts have applied. For instance, the following 
examples drawn from case law are within the evaluation test’s 
scope: “Swiss Re’s sub-prime-related activities outside its invested 
assets had ‘significantly less risk than the risk that [Swiss Re was] 
exposed to through the investment that [it had] made recently in 
sub-prime bonds’”;133 statements about the “sustainability” of 
restructuring;134 statements about a “strong balance sheet”;135 “we 
                                                                                                             
 130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. d (1977) (“Indeed, 
every assertion of the existence of a thing is a representation of the speaker’s 
state of mind, namely, his belief in its existence.”). 
 131. In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“Most ratings are, therefore, best understood as statements of opinion, not as 
unadulterated statements of objective fact.”). 
 132. Id. (“Armed with the same background facts, two knowledgeable 
analysts, each acting in the utmost good faith, could well assign different ratings 
to the same stock.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538A cmt. b (1977) 
(“One common form of opinion is a statement of the maker’s judgment . . . as to 
which opinions may be expected to differ.”). 
 133. Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 
753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (alterations in original). 
 134. In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
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believe, given all the facts we know today, it is at the right reserve 
levels,”136 statements about the adequacy of reserves for predicted 
loan losses;137 and a credit rating.138 Each of these examples 
represents the speaker’s evaluation of known facts to reach an 
evaluative opinion. Moreover, forward-looking statements, which 
are quintessential opinions, are statements of inference drawn from 
known facts. 
c. Comparison to Tests Applied in the Contexts of Defamation 
and Common Law Fraud 
The evaluation prong of the proposed test is consistent with 
Dean Keeton’s classification of evaluative opinions and with prong 
(b) of the Restatement’s common law fraud test. The inference 
prong of the proposed test is consistent with Dean Keeton’s 
classification of deductive opinions and, like Dean Keeton’s 
classification, is narrower than prong (a) of the common law fraud 
test.  
In particular, the evaluation–inference test proposed in this 
Article is narrower than the common law fraud test because it 
excludes mere qualified statements of fact from the definition of 
opinion. For example, if a company’s CEO were to state, “I believe 
that we started that product line in 2002,” this would not qualify as 
an opinion for purposes of securities fraud because the statement’s 
substance is knowable to the speaker. This statement expresses 
neither the CEO’s judgment nor the speaker’s inference. Rather, 
this statement more closely resembles a qualified statement of fact.  
This category of statement is excluded from the proposed 
definition of opinion for two reasons. First, the inclusion of a 
qualification does not have independent value to merit the 
heightened requirements associated with statements of opinion. 
Rather than exercising judgment or making an inference, the CEO 
is merely qualifying the statement to express uncertainty. This 
qualification does not have independent value that transforms a 
statement of fact about the year that the product line was launched 
into a statement of opinion.  
                                                                                                             
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 144 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 137. Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1185, 
2010 WL 3545389, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010). 
 138. In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters. Inc. Inv. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 
639 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
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Second, the inclusion of a statement of belief about a fact that 
is known to the speaker is the mere expression of a statement 
implicit in every factual representation. Every statement of fact is 
accompanied by the implicit representation that the speaker 
believes that the statement is accurate.139 Thus, the explicit 
inclusion of the phrase “I think” should not magically transform a 
statement of fact into an opinion with the concomitant subjective 
falsity requirement. For example, a CEO stating, “We started the 
product line in 2002,” would contain the implicit representation 
that the CEO believed this fact to be true. The mere verbalization 
of an implicit statement should not operate to transform a 
statement of fact into a statement of opinion. 
The qualification is not thereby meaningless, however. If the 
qualification were sufficient to render it unreasonable for an 
investor to rely on the accompanying statement of fact, the element 
of materiality would not be met.140 As an example, if the CEO 
were to make the following qualified assertion of fact, it would 
likely be immaterial as a matter of law: “I don’t have the data in 
front of me and my memory is shaky, but I believe we started the 
product line in 2002.” The inclusion of a qualification does not, 
however, transform this statement into an opinion.  
IV. WHEN IS AN OPINION MATERIAL? 
As this Article has argued so far, an opinion is defined as a 
statement expressing the speaker’s evaluation or inference of 
facts,141 and an opinion is only false if the speaker both objectively 
unreasonably and subjectively disbelieved it.142 A final complexity 
remains when applying the elements of securities fraud to 
statements of opinion: When is a statement of opinion “material”? 
Courts routinely divide statements of opinion in two groups: (1) 
those that are immaterial as a matter of law; and (2) those that are 
potentially material. Despite the fact that this division is often 
outcome determinative, courts fail to apply a uniform, analytically 
sound test to differentiate between these two types of opinions.  
                                                                                                             
 139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. d (1977) (“Indeed, 
every assertion of the existence of a thing is a representation of the speaker’s 
state of mind, namely, his belief in its existence.”). 
 140. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (defining 
materiality as “a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed 
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available” (citation omitted)). 
 141. See supra Part III.E. 
 142. See supra Part III.D. 
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Part A of this section demonstrates that courts routinely 
dismiss statements of opinion as immaterial as a matter of law, yet 
Part B shows that courts fail to apply analytically sound tests when 
deciding which statements to categorize as immaterial. To solve 
the analytical problems underlying the tests that courts currently 
apply, Part C proposes the following reasonable implication test in 
order to identify those opinions that are potentially material: Does 
the opinion reasonably imply an allegedly false, material fact? 
Further, Part C demonstrates that the reasonable implication test is 
informed by and consistent with comparable tests applied in the 
contexts of defamation and common law fraud. 
A. Courts Distinguish Between Opinions That Are Immaterial As a 
Matter of Law and Those That Are Potentially Actionable 
An alleged misrepresentation is material for purposes of 
securities fraud if there is “a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”143 Stated differently, a statement is material if “there is 
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would 
consider it important” in deciding how to invest.144 
The objective materiality standard for securities fraud balances 
the fundamental importance of fair and honest markets against the 
dangers of setting the materiality standard too low.145 On one hand, 
as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]here cannot be honest 
markets without honest publicity.”146 This consideration weighs in 
                                                                                                             
 143. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (citation omitted). 
 144. Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 
449 (1976)). 
 145. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The 
Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 
28–29 (2009) (explaining this delicate balance); see also Hoffman, supra note 
14, at 1398 (characterizing the puffery doctrine as “walking the line between 
overdeterrence of speech and underdeterrence of fraud”). As noted by Professor 
Margaret V. Sachs, the objective materiality standard also achieves a related 
delicate balance between encouraging and discouraging investor class actions by 
simultaneously enabling and limiting them. Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and 
Social Change: The Case for Replacing “The Reasonable Investor” with “The 
Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 486–
89 (2006). On one hand, the objective standard permits a class-wide 
determination of materiality. Id. On the other hand, the materiality standard 
limits strike suits by barring claims premised on alleged misrepresentations upon 
which only an unreasonable investor would have relied. Id. 
 146. Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)). 
See also 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (stating that one purpose of 
securities regulation is “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets”); 
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favor of a lower materiality standard—both to lower the bar for 
required disclosures and to deter affirmative false statements. On 
the other hand, an unduly low standard carries its own dangers. 
When applied to a company’s omissions, “a minimal standard 
might bring an overabundance of information within its reach, and 
lead management ‘simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche 
of trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to 
informed decisionmaking.’”147 Moreover, when applied to 
affirmative misrepresentations, the materiality standard prevents 
“every miniscule inaccuracy in public statements of SEC filings” 
from being actionable, thus encouraging companies to speak 
voluntarily without fear of inadvertently incurring liability.148  
Although the materiality element is a question of fact, courts 
routinely dismiss statements of opinion because they are 
immaterial as a matter of law,149 often characterizing these 
statements as “mere puffery.”150 Although the term puffery is 
                                                                                                             
 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 230 (recognizing that a central purpose of the securities laws 
is “to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices”); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the securities 
law is “to provide investors with full disclosure of material information 
concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors 
against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote 
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing”). 
 147. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448–49). 
 148. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 
12.9[3][B] (6th ed. 2011). 
 149. See David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 537, 585–86 (2006) (reporting the results of an empirical study) 
(“Over time . . . courts have become more willing to apply ‘puffery’ and 
‘bespeaks caution’ doctrines which are (1) bright-line rules that focus on the 
language of disclosures, (2) associated with each other, and (3) more likely to 
appear at early staged in litigation.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, 
How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): 
Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 86, 119 (2002) 
(“In a large number of cases applying the puffery doctrine, this materiality 
determination is made at the motion to dismiss stage.”). 
 150. Woodward v. Raymond James Fin., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[S]tatements of puffery or mere generalizations are not 
material misstatements. A reasonable investor, by definition, does not rely upon 
general and vague statements of puffery.”); In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 
F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1229 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Courts often analyze the materiality 
of such statements because no reasonable investor would rely on a company’s 
subjective expression of optimism for the future.”); In re Guidant Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 913, 928 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (“We note also that several of 
the statements disputed by Plaintiffs can be understood as immaterial, non-
actionable corporate puffery.”); Payne v. DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547, 561 
(W.D. Pa. 2006) (“Puffery comes into play when a court is considering the 
materiality of statements alleged to have been misleading. While materiality 
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technically inapposite in most securities fraud cases,151 this puffery 
characterization has essentially become synonymous with 
immateriality. A few courts have instead tied the puffery 
characterization with the falsity element, stating that puffery is 
incapable of falsity.152 This minority characterization is best 
interpreted as identifying a subset of puffery: Surely, any statement 
that is incapable of falsity is also immaterial because no reasonable 
investor would rely on such a statement when making an 
investment decision.153 
Many scholars have criticized courts’ failure to consider a 
statement’s context when dismissing it as mere puffery.154 As 
Professor Stefan J. Padfield has noted, this practice conflicts with 
the Supreme Court’s mandate to assess a statement’s materiality in 
                                                                                                             
 
determinations are typically reserved for the trier of fact, ‘complaints alleging 
securities fraud often contain claims of omissions or misstatements that are 
obviously so unimportant that courts can rule them immaterial as a matter of law 
at the pleading stage.’” (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 
F.2d 186, 200–01 (3d Cir. 1990) (“To say that a statement is mere ‘puffing’ is, 
in essence, to say that it is immaterial . . . .”); United States v. Causey, No. 
CRIM. H-05-025-SS, 2005 WL 2647976, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2005) 
(“Puffing is not actionable because it is immaterial.”). 
 151. O’Hare, supra note 12, at 1703–22 (arguing that the “puffery” defense 
is inapposite in securities fraud cases premised on a company’s statements to 
investors because, unlike the assumptions underlying the caveat emptor doctrine 
(which is the theoretical underpinning of the puffery defense), the company has 
greater access to information and the investors have a reason to trust the 
company). 
 152. In re Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 400 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“These are exactly the kind of hopeful statements, tinged with 
caution, that cannot reasonably be found to be misleading and therefore relied 
upon to allege violations of the securities laws.”); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, 
Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 767 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“The Fourth Circuit has 
also held that soft, puffing business communications and statements, like those 
profiled above, do not demonstrate falsity.” (citing Howard v. Haddad, 962 F.2d 
328, 331 (4th Cir. 1992))); In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 768 
(“All of the statements Plaintiffs attribute to Defendants as violations of the 
securities laws are ‘soft’ and ‘puffery’ as defined in cases such as Howard, and 
thus do not demonstrate falsity.”). 
 153. Accord In re Trex Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 454 F. Supp. 2d 560, 572 (W.D. 
Va. 2006) (“For a statement to be material, it must be demonstrably false.”). 
 154. E.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the Name 
of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 171 (2010); O’Hare, 
supra note 12, at 1737 (“[C]ourt[s] should not simply review the language of the 
statement, label the statement as puffery, and dismiss the action as a matter of 
law.”). 
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light of its effect on “the total mix of information.”155 Somewhat 
cynically, Professors Stephen M. Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati 
have explained this tension as result-oriented: 
[F]or the most part, context seems to matter only when the 
outcome is dismissal. If putting the statement into context 
lends credence to a decision to dismiss, the bespeaks 
caution doctrine is invoked. If taking a statement out of 
context makes dismissal more plausible, however, puffery 
is invoked. It is this disparity of treatment, coupled with the 
superficiality of analysis, which suggests the presence of a 
heuristic.156 
Courts have also struggled with the juxtaposition of the 
Virginia Bankshares holding that statements of opinion can be 
actionable as false statements of fact because they make implicit 
representations157 and the routine practice of dismissing statements 
of opinion as mere puffery. Many courts have characterized 
Virginia Bankshares’ holding as a limitation or exception to the 
general rule that puffery is not actionable.158 For example, in In re 
                                                                                                             
 155. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (1988) (citation omitted) 
(stating the “total mix” standard); Padfield, supra note 154, at 171 (“Courts 
generally ignore context when applying the puffery doctrine, contrary to the 
‘total mix’ aspect of the definition of materiality.”). 
 156. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 149, at 123. 
 157. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991). 
 158. In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1231 (S.D. Cal. 
2010) (“Like his predictions in September 2003, Ragland’s December 
statements are optimistic statements that usually are not actionable as securities 
fraud. Plaintiffs rely on the exception to that general rule. They argue that 
Ragland knew his positive, public statements were inaccurate at the time he 
made them.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec. 
Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting the defendants’ 
argument that the alleged misstatements were inactionable “statements of 
opinion and puffery” because “opinion statements are actionable if Plaintiffs can 
plead ‘with particularity that defendants did not sincerely believe the opinion 
they purported to hold’” (quoting Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F. 
Supp. 2d 146, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))); In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 452 F. 
Supp. 2d 1005, 1033 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (“This [‘mere puffery’] rule has its 
limitations; a projection of optimism becomes actionable ‘when (1) the 
statement is not actually believed, (2) there is no reasonable basis for the belief, 
or (3) the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine 
the statement’s accuracy.’” (citations omitted)); Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 
Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The important limitation on 
these principles is that optimistic statements may be actionable upon a showing 
that the defendants did not genuinely or reasonably believe the positive opinions 
they touted (i.e., the opinion was without a basis in fact or the speakers were 
aware of facts undermining the positive statements), or that the opinions imply 
certainty.”); Fisher v. Kansas, 467 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
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Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, the court stated that puffery 
could be actionable if it were objectively and subjectively false: 
These [statements] are expressions of “puffery and 
corporate optimism” that “do not give rise to securities 
violations.” Such statements of optimism or predictions 
about future performance are actionable only “if they are 
worded as guarantees or are supported by specific 
statements of fact, or if the speaker does not genuinely or 
reasonably believe them.”159 
Other courts have skirted the issue, dismissing securities fraud 
claims based on opinions both because the objective–subjective 
falsity element is not satisfied and because they are immaterial as a 
matter of law.160 
Contrary to the reasoning of these courts, the analytically 
sound way to rationalize the Virginia Bankshares holding that 
                                                                                                             
 
(immediately after determining that the alleged misrepresentations were 
“inactionable puffery,” suggesting that they would potentially be actionable if 
they were objectively and subjectively false); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. 
Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 669–70 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Thus, federal courts 
‘everywhere “have demonstrated a willingness to find immaterial as a matter of 
law certain kinds of rosy affirmation heard from corporate managers and 
numbingly familiar to the marketplace-loosely optimistic statements that are so 
vague, [and] so lacking in specificity, . . . that no reasonable investor could find 
them important to the total mix of information available.”’ However, opinions 
may be deemed false or misleading under the securities laws if proof of their 
falsity can be established ‘through the orthodox evidentiary process.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 159. In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (citations omitted). 
 160. Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 145 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(“There is no showing that O’Hara believed these statements to be false when 
made, as set out in more detail in the next section. Moreover, these statements 
are generally not actionable as a general statement of optimism.”); In re Apple 
Computer, Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 304 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]laintiffs do not 
allege any factual statement that was false. . . . [T]hat the new Power Mac was 
quite possibly the ‘best Power Mac ever’ is an opinion, plausibly held. Further, 
when valuing a corporation, investors do not rely on such vague statements of 
optimism.” (citations omitted)); In re No. Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 
51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29–30 (D. Mass. 1999) (“Thus, the statements regarding 
expected sales growth in the fourth quarter are not actionable. . . . Soft, puffing 
statements such as these generally lack materiality because the market price of a 
share is not inflated by vague statements predicting growth. The Class contends 
that such statements can be actionable when accompanied by facts known by 
[the defendant], and contemporaneous with the [challenged statements], that 
would show that [the defendant’s] anticipated success was unlikely. That may be 
true, but the Class has not alleged any such facts . . . .” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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opinions can be actionable as false statements of fact with the 
puffery doctrine is to recognize that they address different 
elements of a securities fraud claim—with the former addressing 
the misrepresentation of fact element and the latter addressing the 
materiality element. The court in In re XM Satellite Radio 
Holdings Securities Litigation accurately explained this 
relationship: 
Plaintiffs argue that under Virginia Bankshares, statements 
such as these that “reflect the [d]efendants’ opinions or 
‘subjective assessment’” are actionable if they lack “a 
factual basis that justifies them as accurate, the absence of 
which renders them misleading.” However, such statements 
of opinion may only be actionable under § 12(b) if they are 
materially misleading.161 
Stated otherwise, under Virginia Bankshares, a statement of 
opinion can qualify as a false statement of fact, thus satisfying the 
misrepresentation of fact element. Of course, this is only one 
element of a securities fraud claim. The misrepresentation of fact 
must also be material. The puffery doctrine relates to whether the 
materiality element is satisfied. Therefore, the courts that 
characterize Virginia Bankshares as a limitation or exception to the 
puffery doctrine are, in effect, characterizing apples as an 
exception to oranges. Instead, courts should recognize that, under 
Virginia Bankshares, a statement of opinion can qualify as a 
“misrepresentation of fact.” Then, if this element is satisfied (as 
well as the other elements), courts should analyze whether that 
misrepresentation of fact is mere puffery or potentially material.162 
B. Courts Fail to Apply Analytically Sound Tests to Identify 
Statements of Opinion That Are Immaterial As a Matter of Law 
Courts apply various tests, many of which are analytically 
unsound, to identify statements of opinion that are immaterial 
                                                                                                             
 161. In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 182 
n.13 (D.D.C. 2007) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); id. at 177 
(“Under the doctrine established by Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg . . . 
statements of opinion, if they are material, may be actionable if they are not 
actually believed when made, if there is no reasonable basis for them, or if the 
speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to undermine the 
statements’ accuracy.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 162. E.g., In re Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 53 (1st Cir. 
2005) (“Because the plaintiffs have failed to meet these PSLRA pleading 
requirements in regard to subjective falsity and scienter, we need not address 
other issues, such as . . . the materiality of the allegedly false statements . . . .”). 
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puffery, resulting in conflicting and confusing precedent. As the 
court aptly stated in Scritchfield v. Paolo, “[T]he line of 
demarcation between puffery and actionable misstatement is often 
less than pellucid.”163 Indeed, Professors Bainbridge and Gulati 
have criticized the puffery doctrine as a prime example of a 
substantive law heuristic that judges apply because of their lack of 
experience in securities law, overreliance on law clerks, and desire 
to move cases off of their dockets.164 
For example, applying various puffery tests, courts have held 
that the following opinions are immaterial as a matter of law: 
There is a “high likelihood” that a merger will close;165 we have an 
“expectation of continued strong market growth”;166 production of 
a product “seems to be getting fairly close to fruition”;167 a product 
is “quality” or “best”;168 marketing expenditures are “cost 
effective,” “sound,” “smart,” and “efficient”;169 the new Power 
Mac is quite possibly the “best Power Mac ever”;170 the company 
and its licensees have made “remarkable progress toward 
commercialization of our MRAM intellectual property”;171 the 
acquisition created “a premier financial services franchise with 
significantly enhanced wealth management, investment banking 
and international capabilities”;172 a newly combined firm is 
“uniquely positioned to win market share”;173 the inventory system 
is “dynamic”;174 the project is “moving forward quite 
smoothly”;175 there is “tremendous market interest” in the XT3 
                                                                                                             
 163. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D.R.I. 2003). 
 164. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 149, at 86, 119–22. 
 165. In re Guidant Corp. Sec. Litig., 536 F. Supp. 2d 913, 928 n.15 (S.D. Ind. 
2008) (dismissing as puffery a statement “in which Defendant Dollens expressed 
his opinion that there was a very high likelihood that the J & J merger would 
close”). 
 166. Id. (dismissing as puffery a press release that “indicated an expectation 
of continued strong market growth”). 
 167. In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 896 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 168. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 
671 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 169. In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 180 
(D.D.C. 2007). 
 170. In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 304 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 171. In re NVE Corp., 551 F. Supp. 2d at 898. 
 172. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 757 F. Supp. 
2d 260, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Commc’ns Workers of Am. Plan for Emps. Pensions & Death Benefits 
v. CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Ariz. 2007). 
 175. Limantour v. Cray Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1153 (W.D. Wash. 
2006). 
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product;176 the company’s smart antennas are “ideal solutions”;177 
and “we currently view our shares as undervalued.”178  
On the other hand, courts have held that the following—
arguably equally vague and ambiguously optimistic—opinions are 
potentially material: Sales and demand for a product are 
“strong”;179 the company is “pleased” with its performance and 
financial results;180 a pharmaceutical product was “well-received” 
by physicians;181 interest in two technologies “has never been 
higher”;182 the second quarter indicated “increasing demand”;183 
the company’s customer service is “great,” “truly exceptional,” and 
“superior”;184 the company is the “premier provider of high-speed 
DSL services in the Northeast corridor”;185 due diligence was 
“very, very extensive.”186  
Indeed, consistent with these latter holdings, the Supreme 
Court in Virginia Bankshares rejected the defendants’ argument 
that directors’ opinions that a merger plan afforded “high” value 
and that a merger price was “fair” were immaterial as a matter of 
law.187 The company argued that no reasonable investor would 
consider these “indefinite and unverifiable expressions” to be 
important when deciding how to vote.188 Noting the information 
imbalance between shareholders and directors and the common 
understanding that directors owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders,189 the Court held: “That such statements may be 
                                                                                                             
 176. Id. 
 177. In re Metawave Commc’ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 
1090–91 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
 178. In re Staffmark, Inc. Sec. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (E.D. Ark. 
2000). 
 179. In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1033 (S.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Billhofer v. Flamel Techs., SA, 663 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 183. In re Metawave Commc’ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 
1085–86 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
 184. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 184 (D.R.I. 2003). 
 185. Id. at 175. 
 186. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 757 F. Supp. 
2d 260, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 187. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1091 (“Shareholders know that directors usually have knowledge 
and expertness far exceeding the normal investor’s resources, and the directors’ 
perceived superiority is magnified even further by the common knowledge that 
state law customarily obliges them to exercise their judgment in the 
shareholders’ interest.”).  
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materially significant raises no serious question.”190 Yet, as the 
former holdings demonstrate, courts routinely dismiss comparable 
statements on the basis that they are immaterial as a matter of law. 
In sum, courts do not consistently separate opinions that are 
immaterial as a matter of law from those that are potentially 
material. This chaos is not surprising because courts apply a 
variety of vague, and sometimes analytically unsound, tests to 
make this distinction.  
1. The Primary Tests Currently Applied 
a. The Unduly Vague Test 
One of the tests most frequently applied to identify opinions 
that are immaterial as a matter of law is the unduly vague 
standard.191 The Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc. court’s explanation of 
this standard is typical: “Vague statements of opinion are not 
actionable under the federal securities laws because they are 
considered immaterial and discounted by the market as mere 
‘puffing.’”192 Courts applying the unduly vague test look for words 
like quality or best, which are “too squishy” and “too untethered to 
anything measurable,”193 or similar words like sound or efficient, 
which are mere “generalized positive statements.”194 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. at 1090. 
 191. In re Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corp.) Sec. Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 364, 397 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The corporate puffery rule applies to loose optimism about 
both a company’s current state of affairs and its future prospects.”); Limantour 
v. Cray Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1146 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (“To determine 
whether a statement is mere puffery, the Court must examine whether a 
statement is so ‘exaggerated’ or ‘vague’ that no reasonable investor would rely 
on the statement when considering the total mix of available information.”); In 
re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 766–67 (E.D. Va. 
2004) (“Courts have demonstrated a willingness to find immaterial, as a matter 
of law, a certain kind of rosy affirmation commonly heard from corporate 
managers and familiar to the marketplace-loosely optimistic statements that are 
so vague, so lacking in specificity, or so clearly constituting the opinions of the 
speaker, that no reasonable investor could find them important to the total mix 
of information available.”); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 
186, 200–01 (3d Cir. 1990) (“To say that a statement is mere ‘puffing’ is, in 
essence, to say that it is immaterial, either because it is so exaggerated (‘You 
cannot lose.’) or so vague (‘This bond is marvelous.’) . . . .”). 
 192. Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1245 (N.D. Cal 1998). 
 193. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 
671 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 194. In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 180 
(D.D.C. 2007). 
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b. The Hyperbole Test 
The hyperbole test is also frequently used to differentiate 
immaterial opinions from those that are potentially material.195 As 
the Eighth Circuit explained, some opinions are “such obvious 
hyperbole that no reasonable investor would rely upon them.”196 
The Third Circuit cited the statement “you cannot lose” as an 
opinion that is “so exaggerated” as to be immaterial as a matter of 
law.197 For example, courts have dismissed characterizations of 
MRAM memory technology as “the Holy Grail of memory”198 and 
of a new product called the G4 Cube as “the most beautiful product 
[Apple] ever designed”199 as immaterial as a matter of law.  
c. The Commonplace Test 
Under the commonplace test, which often overlaps with the 
unduly vague and hyperbole tests, courts dismiss opinions as 
immaterial as a matter of law because they are “commonplace” 
statements by a corporate manager. Courts have characterized 
these opinions as “rosy affirmation[s] commonly heard from 
corporate managers and familiar to the marketplace”200 and as 
“nothing more than a general platitude that accompanies nearly 
every press release or public statement issued by a financial 
institution.”201 Applying this test, one court in the Eastern District 
of Arkansas explained: 
In this case, the Defendants are credited with making such 
comments as “we currently view our shares as 
undervalued,” and “StaffMark’s share price ha[s] declined 
below its fair value,” and “we are buyers at these prices.” 
However, any investor tuning into a cable business 
                                                                                                             
 195. Limantour, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (“To determine whether a statement 
is mere puffery, the Court must examine whether a statement is so ‘exaggerated’ 
or ‘vague’ that no reasonable investor would rely on the statement when 
considering the total mix of available information.”). 
 196. Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 197. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200–01 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 198. In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 895 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 199. In re Apple Computer, Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 301(9th Cir. 2005) 
(alteration in original). 
 200. In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 766–67 
(E.D. Va. 2004). 
 201. Woodward v. Raymond James Fin., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 425, 434–35 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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program on any given day would hear the same or similar 
comments being made by some corporate executive touting 
the strength of his company and the bargain price for which 
its shares currently sell. No reasonable investor would be 
influenced by such statements.202 
For the same reason, a court in the Southern District of New 
York dismissed the following opinion as immaterial as a matter of 
law: “Raymond James’ leadership believes that the managed 
growth strategy, commitment to risk management and conservative 
lending practices that helped the firm avert the subprime crisis and 
post solid operating results in 2007 will continue to serve the 
company well in the coming year.”203 
2. A Fundamental Flaw in the Primary Tests 
In addition to their tendency to lead to inconsistent results, a 
fundamental problem with these primary tests is that they fail to 
recognize that a reasonable investor could actually rely on opinions 
falling within these tests’ scope. For example, “X product is a good 
product” is a quintessential “unduly vague” statement.204 And 
indeed, courts applying the unduly vague standard are correct that 
a reasonable investor would not rely on this representation as an 
indication about the relative quality of X product.205 These courts 
fail to recognize, however, that a reasonable investor could rely on 
this statement as a representation that, at the very least, X product 
has not been recalled. By dismissing the statement out of hand as 
an unduly vague opinion, without an inquiry into what component 
of the statement is allegedly false or misleading, courts sweep the 
puffery brush too broadly.  
                                                                                                             
 202. In re Staffmark, Inc. Sec. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (E.D. Ark. 
2000) (alteration in original). 
 203. Woodward, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 434. 
 204. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200–01 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (“To say that a statement is mere ‘puffing’ is, in essence, to say that it 
is immaterial, either because it is so exaggerated (‘You cannot lose.’) or so 
vague (‘This bond is marvelous.’) . . . .”). 
 205. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 
671 (6th Cir. 2005). (“[S]uch statements describing a product in terms of 
‘quality’ or ‘best’ or benefiting from ‘aggressive marketing’ are too squishy, too 
untethered to anything measurable, to communicate anything that a reasonable 
person would deem important to a securities investment decision. The 
statements are analogous to those deemed immaterial by a broad spectrum of 
federal courts.”). 
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Similarly, the statement that MRAM is “the Holy Grail of 
memory” falls squarely within the hyperbole test.206 Again, courts 
are correct that a reasonable investor would not rely on an opinion 
like this one as a representation about whether MRAM has 300 
gigabytes or 400 gigabytes of capacity. Courts fail to recognize, 
however, that a reasonable investor could interpret this statement 
as a representation that MRAM has at least some memory 
capacity. Courts’ dismissal of hyperbolic statements like this 
without inquiring into what component of the opinion is allegedly 
false is too simplistic. 
Finally, opinions within the commonplace test suffer from the 
same problem. For example, courts are correct that no reasonable 
investor would interpret the opinion “we currently view our shares 
as undervalued” as a representation that the shares’ fundamental 
value is higher than the market price,207 but a reasonable investor 
could interpret it as a representation that the company is not 
insolvent, rendering its shares worthless. Dismissal of opinions like 
this one without an inquiry into what component of the opinion is 
allegedly false fails to recognize this nuance. 
Indeed, the results of a recent materiality survey performed by 
Professor Padfield are consistent with this analytical flaw.208 The 
survey presented five short factual scenarios, drawn from actual 
cases in which alleged misrepresentations were dismissed as 
immaterial, and asked participants if they would “consider the 
additional information important in deciding whether to buy [the 
company’s] stock.”209 For example, the survey presented some 
background information about the demand for Telco’s product, the 
T-6500. Then, the survey asked the following question: 
Assume you are now considering buying Telco stock and 
you receive the following additional information: Later, in 
response to a question, Telco’s CEO states, “On the 6500, 
demand for that product is exceeding our expectations.” 
Would you consider the additional information important in 
deciding whether to buy Telco stock? Yes [or] no.210 
Sixty-two percent of the survey’s respondents answered 
“yes.”211 Professor Padfield interpreted the survey results as 
                                                                                                             
 206. In re NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 895 (D. Minn. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 207. In re Staffmark, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1173. 
 208. Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should 
Ask Them, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339 (2008). 
 209. Id. at 377–81. 
 210. Id. at 380. 
 211. Id. at 373. 
2013] OPINIONS ACTIONABLE 427 
 
 
 
suggesting “that judges are too quick to grant dismissals in 
securities cases on the basis of puffery.”212  
This author agrees with Professor Padfield’s conclusion but 
argues further that the survey highlights the importance of 
incorporating alleged falsity into the materiality analysis. Notably 
missing from the survey’s factual scenarios were allegations about 
why the statements were false. For example, on one hand, a 
reasonable investor might very well consider the Telco CEO’s 
statement to be material because it implies that the 6500 product is 
still in production. On the other hand, no reasonable investor 
would consider the CEO’s statement to constitute an implied 
representation about a specific level of demand for the product. 
Asking survey participants to assess the materiality of the 
statement in a vacuum, effectively asking them to speculate for 
themselves about why a statement might be misleading, invariably 
leads to inconsistent results, as it did in this survey. The same 
lesson applies to courts. 
3. Courts’ Analytically Unsound Attempts to Solve the Problem 
with the Primary Tests 
Implicitly recognizing that the primary tests sweep too broadly, 
some courts have developed “exceptions” whereby opinions are 
actionable despite falling within the scope of these tests. These 
exceptions are analytically unsound, however, because they are 
premised on the notion that establishing another element of 
securities fraud can magically revive the materiality element. 
The first exception applied by some courts is that puffery 
becomes actionable if disbelieved.213 For example, a district court 
in the Southern District of California explained this exception as 
follows: “Ragland’s December statements are optimistic 
statements that usually are not actionable as securities fraud. 
Plaintiffs rely on the exception to that general rule. They argue that 
                                                                                                             
 212. Id. at 375. 
 213. HAZEN, supra note 148, § 12.9[4] (“Reading the relevant securities 
cases yields the following general rule: while a good faith opinion (or even 
‘puffing’) is not material, a statement of opinion made with no belief in its truth 
is actionable.”). E.g., In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 507 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Optimistic statements, however, ‘may be actionable upon a 
showing that the defendants did not genuinely or reasonably believe the positive 
opinions they touted . . . or that the opinions imply certainty.’” (quoting Lapin v. 
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))); 
Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 2d 117, 144–45 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(suggesting that “non-actionable statements of opinion” are nonetheless 
actionable if the defendants did not sincerely believe the opinions that they 
purported to hold). 
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Ragland knew his positive, public statements were inaccurate at 
the time he made them.”214 Similarly, a district court in the 
Southern District of New York rejected the defendants’ argument 
that the alleged misstatements were nonactionable “statements of 
opinion and puffery” because “opinion statements are actionable if 
Plaintiffs can plead ‘with particularity that defendants did not 
sincerely believe the opinion they purported to hold.’”215 
This exception is analytically unsound because it is premised 
on the notion that the presence of one element of securities fraud—
scienter—can transform an immaterial statement into a material 
one.216 This exception conflates the scienter and materiality 
elements. 
The second exception developed by courts is that puffery 
becomes actionable if extremely false.217 For example, a district 
court in the Southern District of New York applied this exception 
as follows: 
[A]lthough statements that sales and demand for Ceclor CD 
were “strong,” that the Company was “pleased” with 
Dura’s performance and financial results, and that Ceclor 
CD was “well received” by physicians are generalized, the 
facts alleged in the TAC lead to a strong inference that 
there was no reasonable basis for believing such statements 
to be true because the sales were achieved by overloading 
                                                                                                             
 214. In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1231 (S.D. Cal. 
2010) (citations omitted). 
 215. In re DRDGold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 472 F. Supp. 2d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (quoting Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 216. See In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 
177 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Under the doctrine established by Virginia Bankshares v. 
Sandberg . . . statements of opinion, if they are material, may be actionable if 
they are not actually believed when made, if there is no reasonable basis for 
them, or if the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts that tend seriously to 
undermine the statements’ accuracy.” (emphasis added)). 
 217. E.g., In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 768 
(E.D. Va. 2004) (“Plaintiffs, in rebuttal, cite In re Cinar Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. 
Supp. 2d 279, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 
F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d Cir. 1994)), which holds that puffery is acceptable only 
‘[if] the company has some legitimate reason to be optimistic.’ . . . Even under 
CINAR, Defendants had, as most corporate executives do, some legitimate 
reason for optimism.” (alteration in original)); Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 
F.3d 738, 746–47 (7th Cir. 1997) (characterizing the puffery inquiry as whether 
a company said things that were so discordant with reality that they would 
induce a reasonable investor to buy the stock at a higher price than it was worth 
ex ante). 
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wholesalers with the product. Accordingly, the puffery rule 
does not insulate Defendants from liability.218 
A district court in the Southern District of Texas stated the 
exception similarly: 
Standing alone, general statements of corporate optimism 
are often held by courts to be immaterial as a matter of law. 
However, when juxtaposed to allegations of falsity capable 
of proof by evidence of historical fact, generally optimistic 
statements are not immune from charges of fraud merely 
because they are vague, conclusory expressions of opinion 
and belief about a company’s then-current and/or future 
prospects.219 
Applying this exception, courts have held that the following 
statements—which fall within the scope of the primary puffery 
tests—are nonetheless actionable: that the company’s customer 
service is “great,” “truly exceptional,” “superior,” the “best,” and 
“world class”;220 that orders during the quarter indicated 
“increasing demand”;221 and that interest and certain technology 
has “never been higher.”222 
Again, this exception is premised on the analytically unsound 
idea that the presence of one element of securities fraud—here, 
falsity—can transform an immaterial statement into a material 
one.223 This exception conflates the falsity and materiality 
elements.  
                                                                                                             
 218. In re Dura Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1033 (S.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
 219. United States v. Causey, No. CRIM. H-05-025-SS, 2005 WL 2647976, 
at *9 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2005). 
 220. Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 184 (D.R.I. 2003). 
 221. In re Metawave Commc’ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 
1086 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
 222. Billhofer v. Flamel Techs., SA, 663 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (S.D.N.Y 
2009) (rejecting a puffery argument) (“Even if companies measure ‘interest’ in 
their products in a variety of ways, they cannot then make categorical claims 
that interest has never been higher without some basis for that statement.”). 
 223. Commc’ns Workers of Am. Plan for Emps. Pensions & Death Benefits 
v. CSK Auto Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Ariz. 2007) (“No matter 
how untrue a statement may be, it is not actionable if it is not the type of 
statement that would significantly alter the total mix of information available to 
investors.” (quoting Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1245 (N.D. 
Cal. 1998))). 
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C. Courts Should Apply the Novel Reasonable Implication Test to 
Identify Opinions That Are Immaterial As a Matter of Law 
This Article proposes that courts apply the following 
reasonable implication test to distinguish potentially material 
opinions from those that are immaterial as a matter of law: Does 
the opinion reasonably imply an allegedly false, material fact? 
Several scholars, without citation to authority for this test, have 
assumed that a test similar to the reasonable implication test 
applies when analyzing whether a statement of opinion is material. 
Professor Thomas Lee Hazen, in the treatise The Law of Securities 
Regulation, characterizes as a “general rule” that “merely because 
statements are couched as opinion does not preclude a finding that 
there is an express or implied misrepresentation of fact.”224 
Similarly, Professor Peter Huang, in passing, stated: “To be legally 
actionable, puffery must induce false implied meanings that are 
thus deceptive, misleading, and can be disproved.”225 Courts have 
not adopted this test, however. This Article seeks to provide a 
theoretical basis for the reasonable implication test, with the goal 
of convincing courts to apply this test when analyzing the 
materiality of statements of opinion. 
1. Solution to the Analytical Problem Underlying the Primary 
Tests 
This proposed reasonable implication test solves the analytical 
problem underlying the primary tests currently used to differentiate 
immaterial opinions from those that are potentially material 
because it incorporates an inquiry into what component of the 
opinion is allegedly false or misleading. For example, the 
materiality of the vague opinion “X product is a good product” 
would depend on why the plaintiff contended that the opinion was 
false. If the plaintiff contended that this opinion was false because 
the product was of lesser quality than competitors’ products, the 
court would dismiss the opinion as immaterial as a matter of law. 
The opinion, with its use of the vague word great, does not 
reasonably imply this allegedly false fact.226 On the other hand, if 
                                                                                                             
 224. HAZEN, supra note 148, § 12.9[4]. 
 225. Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking 
the Materiality of Information and the Reasonableness of Investor, 13 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 99, 115 (2005). 
 226. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200–01 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (“To say that a statement is mere ‘puffing’ is, in essence, to say that it 
is immaterial, either because it is so exaggerated (‘You cannot lose.’) or so 
vague (‘This bond is marvelous.’) . . . .”). 
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the plaintiff contended that this opinion was false because the 
product had been recalled for safety defects, the court would rule 
that the opinion is potentially material. The opinion reasonably 
implies that the product is still marketable, which—as alleged—is 
a false, material fact.  
Similarly, the materiality of the hyperbolic statement that 
MRAM is “the Holy Grail of memory” would depend on why the 
plaintiff contended that the opinion was false. If the plaintiff 
contended that it were false because the memory only had 300 
gigabytes of capacity, the court would dismiss the opinion as 
immaterial as a matter of law because the hyperbolic statement 
does not imply a specific memory capacity. If, however, the 
plaintiff contended that the statement was false because the 
MRAM did not have any memory capacity, the court would rule 
that the opinion is potentially material because the opinion 
reasonably implies that MRAM has at least some memory, which 
is an allegedly false, material fact.  
Likewise, the materiality of the commonplace opinion “we 
currently view our shares as undervalued” would depend on why 
the plaintiff contended that the opinion was false. If the plaintiff 
contended that the opinion were false because fundamental value 
did not exceed market price, the court would dismiss the opinion as 
immaterial as a matter of law because no reasonable investor 
would imply from such a commonplace statement a specific 
fundamental value.227 If, however, the plaintiff contended that this 
opinion were false because the company was insolvent and its 
shares worthless, the court would rule that the opinion was 
potentially material. A reasonable investor could imply from the 
opinion that the shares had at least some value—an allegedly false, 
material fact. 
Judge Thomas S. Zilly in the Western District of Washington 
applied an analysis similar to the reasonable implication test when 
analyzing the materiality of the opinions that product orders during 
the second quarter indicated “increasing demand” and that 
“[b]ecause of this, [the company] anticipate[s] improved results in 
the second half of the year.”228 Under the reasonable implication 
test, the materiality of these opinions would depend on the 
allegedly false component. If the plaintiff contended that these 
opinions implied a greater degree of demand than actually existed, 
the court should dismiss the claim because no reasonable investor 
                                                                                                             
 227. In re Staffmark, Inc. Sec. Litig., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1173 (E.D. Ark. 
2000). 
 228. In re Metawave Commc’ns Corp. Sec. Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 
1062 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
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would interpret these vague statements as implying a certain level 
of demand. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff contended that these 
opinions implied that the product was marketable, the court should 
not dismiss the claim because a reasonable investor could so 
interpret these statements. Judge Zilly’s analysis echoes the 
analysis under the proposed test: “The statements about GSM 
demand did not merely exaggerate the amount of demand, but 
represented that there actually was demand when the GSM product 
was not functional. The statements could be relied upon by a 
reasonable investor.”229 
Thus, this proposed reasonable implication test is an 
analytically sound means of addressing the concerns underlying 
the analytically unsound puffery is actionable if disbelieved and 
puffery is actionable if really false “exceptions.”230 The essence of 
both exceptions is that a vague, optimistic, or commonplace 
opinion should be actionable if reality differs drastically from the 
tone of the opinion statement. The reasonable implication test for 
materiality is consistent with this essence, but it achieves this goal 
in an analytically sound manner. For example, under current tests, 
the opinion “this company is in great shape” would likely be 
characterized as puffery because it is unduly vague and 
commonplace. If the speaker knew at the time of the statement that 
the company would seek bankruptcy protection within 24 hours, 
some courts would attempt to apply one of the analytically 
unsound exceptions to puffery—either because the speaker 
disbelieved the opinion or because the opinion was really false—in 
order to restore the opinion’s materiality. Under the reasonable 
implication test, however, this opinion would be deemed 
potentially material, without resort to these analytically unsound 
exceptions. The court would recognize that, although a reasonable 
investor would not rely on the opinion as a statement about the 
company’s relative profitability, a reasonable investor could 
interpret the opinion as implying that the company was solvent.231 
Because the plaintiff alleged that, in fact, the company was 
insolvent at the time of the statement, the opinion was material 
because it reasonably implied an allegedly false, material fact. 
                                                                                                             
 229. Id. at 1086. 
 230. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 231. Cf. Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 745 (“Suppose that on February 18 Centel’s 
lawyers had told Centel that it couldn’t legally sell any of its assets because they 
were encumbered and the lienors would not give their consent to a sale. In these 
circumstances to have announced that the auction process was going smoothly 
would have been materially deceptive. ‘Going smoothly’ may mean nothing 
more than-going; but it means at least that . . .”). 
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2. Consistent with Well-Reasoned Court Opinions in Securities 
Fraud Context 
This proposed reasonable implication test is consistent with the 
similar recognition of some courts that the materiality of an 
opinion depends on whether the opinion reasonably implies the 
existence of objective facts232 or if it implies certainty.233 As the 
most extreme example, if the opinion not only implies, but also 
explicitly states, that it is supported by “objective data,” it is 
potentially material because it gives rise to a reasonable belief in 
the existence of allegedly false facts.234 Similarly, if an opinion 
reasonably implies the existence of false, material facts, it is 
potentially material.235 For instance, the opinion that due diligence 
                                                                                                             
 232. In re Bank of Am. Corp. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 757 F. Supp. 
2d 260, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]here is a difference between enthusiastic 
statements amounting to general puffery and opinion-based statements that are 
anchored in ‘misrepresentations of existing facts.’” (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 
216 F.3d 300, 315 (2nd Cir. 2000))); Id. (“These statements fall into the 
category of fact-based expressions of opinion rather than enthusiastic, vague, 
forward-looking puffery.”). 
 233. In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (including the heading, “Even if Statements by Moody’s Were Puffery, 
They Implied Certainty”); Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 
221, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The important limitation on these principles is that 
optimistic statements may be actionable upon a showing that . . . the opinions 
imply certainty.”). 
 234. City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 
675 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude that a reasonable juror in this case could 
conclude that Firestone’s statement that ‘the objective data clearly reinforces our 
belief that these are high-quality, safe tires’ carried with it the representation that 
there was a reasonable basis for that belief, and that Firestone was not aware of 
any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the 
statement, and that both those representations were misleading.”). See also In re 
NVE Corp. Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 871, 894 (D. Minn. 2007) (“However, 
the Bridgestone case hinged on the fact that the company had stated that 
‘objective data’ supported its claim. Optimistic statements by Defendants in this 
case regarding the general importance and quality of the MRAM technology did 
not contain any assertion that the statements were supported by ‘objective data’ 
or were otherwise subject to verification by proof.”). 
 235. E.g., Scritchfield v. Paolo, 274 F. Supp. 2d 163, 174 (D.R.I. 2003) 
(“The contribution of Peritus is its emphasis on the objectively reasonable 
inferences, once again supported by context, that can be drawn from the 
challenged language; statements that only evince subjective beliefs or opinions 
are not actionable.”) (discussing In re Peritus Software Servs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
52 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Mass. 1999)); Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge 
Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 02-Civ-0767, 2003 WL 21507294, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 30, 2003) (“[T]he misleading character o[f] a statement is not changed by 
its vagueness or ambiguity. Liability may follow where management 
intentionally fosters a mistaken belief concerning a material fact, such as its 
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was “very, very extensive” was a potentially material “fact-based 
expression[] of opinion”;236 and the opinion that a firm was the 
“premier provider of high-speed DSL services in the Northeast 
corridor” reasonably implied that the firm was “comparatively 
superior to all other high-speed DSL service providers in the 
Northeast.”237 If, on the other hand, the opinion does not 
reasonably imply any allegedly false facts, it is immaterial as a 
matter of law.238 Similarly, if the opinion does not imply certainty 
or is a mere “naked” opinion, it is immaterial as a matter of law.239 
3. Supportive of Policies Underlying Materiality Element 
First, the reasonable implication test responds to the 
widespread scholarly criticism that the puffery doctrine fails to 
incorporate a contextual inquiry.240 The reasonable implication test 
proposed in this Article resolves the tension between the puffery 
doctrine and the “total mix” mandate by incorporating context into 
the materiality analysis.241 Especially relevant to the inquiry into 
whether an opinion implies any false material facts is the following 
contexts: (1) why the plaintiff contends that the opinion is false; 
                                                                                                             
 
evaluation of the company’s progress and earning prospects in the current year.” 
(quoting Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 1980))). 
 236. In re Bank of Am., 757 F. Supp. 2d. at 310. 
 237. Scritchfield, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 175. 
 238. E.g., In re No. Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21 
(D. Mass. 1999) (“Instead, the Class’ only quibble with the statement is the 
implicit meaning that they attribute to the phrase ‘broad product line.’ The Court 
holds, however, that the phrase is incapable of supporting such an inference, as 
any reasonable investor would recognize the phrase simply as bullish corporate 
grandstanding.”). 
 239. In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“Optimistic statements, however, ‘may be actionable upon a showing 
that the defendants did not genuinely or reasonably believe the positive opinions 
they touted . . . or that the opinions imply certainty.’” (quoting Lapin v. 
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))); id. 
at 509 (“Moreover, even if the above mentioned statements asserting 
independence were ones of intention or desire, they also ‘imply certainty,’ and 
therefore fall into the limitation on the general rule . . . .”); Scritchfield, 274 F. 
Supp. 2d at 182 (“Cornell’s forecast that LOA would have 100,000 customers 
by the end of 2000 is a forward-looking statement and does not purport to be 
based on any factual information, whether or not properly calculated, available 
at that time. It is a naked prediction unsupported by any facts, and would not be 
deemed material by a reasonable investor. It is not actionable.”); id. at 187 
(“Likewise, Cornell’s prediction of $15 million in revenues by the end of 2000 
is just that—a naked and unsupported prediction, which is unactionable . . . .”). 
 240. See supra Part IV.A. 
 241. See supra Part IV.A. 
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(2) whether the opinion was expressed in such a way as to imply 
any facts (including the apparent authoritativeness of the speaker); 
and (3) whether the opinion was accompanied by its complete 
factual basis, thereby preventing it from implying any false 
material facts.242 
In addition, the reasonable implication test bolsters the delicate 
balance between ensuring honest markets and encouraging the 
appropriate level of disclosure.243 On one hand, by acknowledging 
that some opinions are reasonably understood as implying false 
material facts and by allowing these opinions to form the basis of 
securities fraud claims, the reasonable implication test incentivizes 
honesty of market participants. On the other hand, by recognizing 
that some opinions are not reasonably understood as implying false 
material facts and by characterizing these opinions as immaterial 
as a matter of law, the reasonable implication test encourages 
company actors to speak freely about their evaluations and 
inferences, without fear that unreasonable implications could lead 
to liability.  
4. Builds on Materiality Tests Proposed by Other Scholars 
The reasonable implication test, to be applied when analyzing 
the materiality of statements of opinion, builds on the scholarly 
work to date on the element of materiality. Scholars addressing the 
materiality–puffery quandary, albeit not limiting their analyses to 
statements of opinion, have proposed various “materiality tests” to 
aid courts in drawing the line between those statements that are 
immaterial as a matter of law and those that are potentially 
material. These various proposed materiality tests circle around the 
same point: Because allegedly puffing statements are sometimes 
expressed when access to information is unequal, investors can 
infer false material facts from them. For example, Professor 
O’Hare, recognizing that allegedly puffing statements are often 
made to investors when there are information asymmetries,244 
argues that the court should examine the following factors to 
determine whether an allegedly puffing statement is immaterial as 
a matter of law: (1) the vagueness of the statement; (2) whether the 
statement is forward-looking or characterizing present facts; and 
(3) whether other factors are present that affect significance to 
investors.245 Similarly, Professor Langevoort, in the context of 
                                                                                                             
 242. See infra Part IV.C.5. 
 243. See supra Part IV.A. 
 244. O’Hare, supra note 12, at 1717–19. 
 245. Id. at 1737. 
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half-truths (where, by definition, some information is withheld 
from investors), argues that the first step is to “assess[] the normal 
inference that flows from a particular statement.”246 Professor 
Hoffman argues that, once a statement has been identified as 
“puffery,” courts should presume that the statement implied false 
factual claims that were relied upon, with the burden shifting to the 
speaker to rebut that presumption by showing one of the following: 
(1) The speaker did not intend to mislead; (2) most of the audience 
did not rely on the statement; or (3) the statement did not imply 
any false facts.247 
This Article proposes that, at least in the context of statements 
of opinion, this central point should itself be elevated to the level 
of a “materiality test.” Indeed, the reasonable implication test 
proposed in this Article asks that very question—Does the opinion 
reasonably imply an allegedly false, material fact? 
Moreover, again not confining their analyses to statements of 
opinion, scholars have decried the difficulty of determining 
whether an allegedly puffing statement implies any false, material 
facts.248 Yet, in the context of opinions at least, well-developed 
bodies of precedent analyze that very question in the contexts of 
defamation and common law fraud. Courts applying the 
reasonable implication test can therefore draw from these deep 
bodies of law to analyze this issue in the securities fraud context. 
5. Informed by Comparable Test Applied in Defamation 
Context 
The reasonable implication test proposed in this Article to 
differentiate immaterial opinions from those that are potentially 
material in securities fraud cases is informed by the comparable 
pure–mixed opinion test applied in defamation cases. The rich 
precedent developed in the context of defamation is an instructive 
guide on the application of this Article’s proposed reasonable 
implication test in securities fraud cases. 
As in the contexts of securities fraud and common-law fraud, 
some statements of opinion are not actionable in defamation, while 
others are potentially actionable.249 In the defamation context, 
however, the distinction between these two types of opinions is not 
                                                                                                             
 246. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 99. 
 247. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 1444. 
 248. E.g., id. at 1440 (“Unfortunately, neither courts nor regulators can easily 
determine when puffery implies facts that are false.”). 
 249. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). 
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premised on the concept of materiality. Rather, it is premised on 
whether the opinion is “mixed”—and thus actionable because it 
implies an undisclosed defamatory fact—or “pure”—and thus 
nonactionable because it does not imply any undisclosed 
defamatory facts.250 At least for evaluative opinions, this 
distinction is compelled by the First Amendment’s protection of 
free expression.251 Scholars are divided on whether the First 
Amendment compels a similar distinction for deductive 
opinions.252 As a practical matter, however, this pure–mixed 
distinction applies to both deductive and evaluative opinions in 
defamation cases because the Second Restatement of Torts and 
most state courts have incorporated the pure–mixed distinction into 
the elements of defamation without distinguishing between 
evaluative and deductive opinions.253  
The defamation precedent developed with respect to the 
distinction between pure and mixed opinions might seem, at first 
glance, to be inapposite to the distinction between material and 
immaterial opinions in the securities fraud context. In fact, the 
pure–mixed distinction and the material–immaterial distinction 
share a similar underlying policy and a similar focus on the 
opinion’s effect on a reasonable listener, justifying further 
examination of the dividing line in defamation cases between pure 
and mixed opinions. 
                                                                                                             
 250. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18–19; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 
(1977). 
 251. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (citing the “breathing space” that “[f]reedoms 
of expression require in order to survive” (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986))). 
 252. Compare Sowle, supra note 119, at 575–77 (arguing that pure deductive 
opinions should not be immunized); Chen, supra note 119, at 375 (arguing that 
the Restatement’s protection of pure deductive opinions goes further than 
required by Milkovich); KEETON, supra note 118, § 113 (arguing that a 
distinction could be made between evaluative opinions and deductive opinions, 
with the First Amendment’s protection for pure opinions applying only to 
evaluation opinions); with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c 
(1977) (asserting that First Amendment protection of “pure” opinion extends to 
all opinions). 
 253. King, supra note 119, at 906 (recognizing that the “uncertain . . . 
constitutional underpinnings of the section 566 rule may prove to have more 
academic than practical importance” because state courts have widely adopted 
the rule, if not as a matter of constitutional law, then as a matter of state law); 
KEETON, supra note 118, § 113 (explaining that the Restatement takes the 
position “that the publication of a derogatory opinion that is a pure opinion of 
either the deductive or evaluative variety is no longer actionable, however 
dishonest the publisher might be in expressing that opinion”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) (applying the pure–mixed distinction to both 
evaluative and deductive opinions). 
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a. Comparable Policies Underlie the Distinction Between Pure 
and Mixed Opinions and Between Material and Immaterial 
Opinions 
The balancing test underlying the distinction between pure and 
mixed opinions is comparable to the balancing test underlying the 
distinction between material and immaterial opinions. When 
crafting the pure–mixed standard to distinguish between opinions 
that are actionable in defamation and those that are protected by 
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court carefully balanced the 
Constitution’s protection of freedom of expression with society’s 
interest in preventing and compensating defamatory attacks on 
citizens’ reputations.254 The Supreme Court described this balance 
as follows: 
The numerous decisions discussed above establishing First 
Amendment protection for defendants in defamation 
actions surely demonstrate the Court’s recognition of the 
Amendment’s vital guarantee of free and uninhibited 
discussion of public issues. But there is also another side to 
the equation; we have regularly acknowledged the 
“important social values which underlie the law of 
defamation,” and recognized that “[s]ociety has a pervasive 
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks 
upon reputation.” . . . We believe our decision in the 
present case holds the balance true.255 
As discussed above,256 the materiality element of securities 
fraud accomplishes a similar balance between encouraging 
disclosure by insulating immaterial statements from liability and 
promoting fair and honest markets by imposing liability on 
material misrepresentations.257  
Additionally, both the materiality analysis in securities fraud 
and the pure–mixed opinion distinction in defamation focus on the 
effect of the statement on a reasonable, objective listener. The 
materiality analysis focuses on whether there is “a substantial 
likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of 
information made available.”258 An investor cannot recover in 
                                                                                                             
 254. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22–23. 
 255. Id. at 22–23 (citation omitted). 
 256. See supra Part IV.A. 
 257. See Couture, supra note 145, at 28–29; see also Hoffman, supra note 
14, at 1398. 
 258. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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securities fraud for a misrepresentation that he or she subjectively 
found important if a reasonable investor would not have done so, 
and a speaker cannot escape liability by contending that he or she 
did not consider the statement important if a reasonable investor 
would have done so. Similarly, the distinction between a pure and 
a mixed opinion focuses on whether “the recipient draws the 
reasonable conclusion that the derogatory opinion expressed in the 
comment must have been based on undisclosed defamatory 
facts.”259 A subject of the statement cannot recover in defamation 
if a recipient unreasonably interpreted an opinion as implying 
undisclosed defamatory facts if a reasonable recipient would not 
have so interpreted it, and a speaker cannot escape liability by 
contending that he or she unreasonably interpreted true facts to 
reach his opinion if a reasonable recipient of the opinion would 
have interpreted it as implying defamatory facts.260 
b. The Pure–Mixed Opinion Distinction Depends on Whether 
the Opinion Implies a Defamatory Fact 
The distinction between a nonactionable “pure” opinion and an 
actionable “mixed” opinion depends on whether the opinion 
implies any “undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the 
opinion.”261 Stated another way, the key is whether the 
“expressions of opinion could be interpreted as including false 
assertions as to factual matters.”262 Pure opinions do not imply any 
undisclosed defamatory facts, while mixed opinions do.263 
One key to assess whether an opinion implies any undisclosed 
defamatory facts is whether the opinion’s complete factual basis is 
stated by the speaker or assumed by both parties. If the complete 
factual basis of an opinion is stated or assumed, the opinion is 
unlikely to imply the existence of other unstated defamatory 
                                                                                                             
 259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977). 
 260. See id. (“The defendant cannot insist that the undisclosed facts were not 
defamatory but that he unreasonably formed the derogatory opinion from 
them.”). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 515 (1991). See 
also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (explaining that the 
distinction depends on whether the opinion “contain[s] a provably false factual 
connotation”); Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 
1998) (“Milkovich directs that an opinion may constitute actionable defamation, 
but only if the opinion can be reasonably interpreted to declare or imply untrue 
facts.”). 
 263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b (1977). 
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facts.264 The D.C. Circuit explained the rationale as follows: 
“Because the reader understands that such supported opinions 
represent the writer’s interpretation of the facts presented, and 
because the reader is free to draw his or her own conclusions based 
upon those facts, this type of statement is not actionable in 
defamation.”265 On the other hand, if the opinion’s complete 
factual basis is not stated, the opinion may imply the existence of 
unstated defamatory facts.266 
As an example of a pure opinion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed 
a defamation claim premised on the opinion that “investors will 
sour on ‘Sugaree’” because “the article clearly disclosed the 
factual bases for its view.”267 The Restatement gives the following 
further example and explanation of a pure opinion: 
A writes to B about his neighbor C: “He moved in six 
months ago. He works downtown, and I have seen him 
during that time only twice, in his backyard around 5:30 
seated in a deck chair with a portable radio listening to a 
news broadcast, and with a drink in his hand. I think he 
must be an alcoholic.” The statement indicates the facts on 
which the expression of opinion was based and does not 
imply others. These facts are not defamatory and A is not 
liable for defamation.268 
As an example of a mixed opinion that is potentially actionable 
as defamatory, the Supreme Court in Milkovich cited the 
                                                                                                             
 264. Id.; Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(noting that when “the bases for the . . . conclusion are fully disclosed, no 
reasonable reader would consider the term anything but the opinion of the author 
drawn from the circumstances related”); Standing Comm. on Discipline v. 
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A statement of opinion based on 
fully disclosed facts can be punished only if the stated facts are themselves false 
and demeaning.”); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 724, 
730–31 (1st Cir. 1992) (when statement provides factual bases for its 
conclusion, it is a “personal conclusion” rather than a statement of fact subject to 
a defamation claim). 
 265. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1144–45 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
 266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. b (1977) (“The second 
kind of expression of opinion, or the mixed type, is one which, while an opinion 
in form or context, is apparently based on facts regarding the plaintiff or his 
conduct that have not been stated by the defendant or assumed to exist by the 
parties to the communication.”). 
 267. Biospherics, Inc., 151 F.3d at 185 (“[T]hese three sentences state the 
factual basis for the entire article and Biospherics does not challenge their 
accuracy. Its failure to do so dooms its challenge to this statement.”). 
 268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 illus. 4 (1977). 
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following: “In my opinion John Jones is a liar.”269 As the Court 
explained, this opinion is potentially actionable because it “implies 
a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told 
an untruth.”270 The Milkovich Court then applied this standard to 
the allegedly defamatory statements before it, including the 
statement that “[a]nyone who attended the meet . . . knows in his 
heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having 
given his solemn oath to tell the truth.”271 The Court reasoned: 
“The dispositive question in the present case then becomes 
whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements 
in the Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich 
perjured himself in a judicial proceeding. We think this question 
must be answered in the affirmative.”272 As another example, the 
Restatement juxtaposes the following illustration of a mixed 
opinion with the illustration of a pure opinion cited in the 
preceding paragraph: “A writes to B about his neighbor C: ‘I think 
he must be an alcoholic.’ A jury might find that this was not just an 
expression of opinion but that it implied that A knew undisclosed 
facts that would justify this opinion.”273 
A second key to distinguishing pure and mixed opinions is to 
recognize that some opinions—such as hyperbole and mere verbal 
abuse—“cannot reasonably be understood to be meant literally and 
seriously.”274 With respect to hyperbole, the Supreme Court 
explained that “[t]his provides assurance that public debate will not 
suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical 
hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of 
our Nation.”275 For example, the characterization of a developer’s 
negotiating position as “blackmail” was not actionable because 
“the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous 
epithet used by those who considered [the] negotiating position 
extremely unreasonable.”276 Similarly, the definition of a union 
scab as a traitor was not actionable because it was “merely 
                                                                                                             
 269. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990). 
 270. Id. at 18–19. 
 271. Id. at 4–5. 
 272. Id. at 21. 
 273. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 illus. 3 (1977). 
 274. Id. § 566 cmt. e (1977); Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19–20 (explaining that 
mere hyperbole is not actionable in defamation because it “cannot ‘reasonably 
[be] interpreted as stating actual facts’ about an individual”). 
 275. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)); Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50 (ad parody “could 
not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public 
figure involved”). 
 276. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 
(1970). 
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rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the 
contempt felt by union members.”277 As a close corollary, verbal 
abuse by angry speakers is unlikely to imply any defamatory facts 
when “it is obvious that the speaker has lost his temper and is 
merely giving vent to insult.”278 For example, “when, in the course 
of an altercation, the defendant loudly and angrily calls the 
plaintiff a bastard in the presence of others, he is ordinarily not 
reasonably to be understood as asserting the fact that the plaintiff is 
of illegitimate birth.”279 
c. The Defamation Precedent on Mixed–Pure Opinions Informs 
the  Proposed Reasonable Implication Test 
First, as explained above, applying the pure–mixed opinion test 
in defamation cases, courts have frequently held that opinions 
accompanied by their factual basis (whether stated by the speaker 
or assumed by both parties) are not actionable in defamation 
because they do not connote false facts.280 Drawing from this 
defamation precedent, courts should similarly hold for purposes of 
securities fraud that an opinion based on fully disclosed or 
mutually assumed facts is immaterial as a matter of law because no 
reasonable investor would interpret the opinion as implying any 
unstated material facts. If an opinion is accompanied by accurate 
factual statements that provide the basis for the opinion, the 
opinion would fail the proposed reasonable implication test 
because it would not reasonably imply any unstated facts.281 Thus, 
the opinion would be immaterial as a matter of law. 
Indeed, a few courts have already recognized in the securities 
fraud context that whether an opinion is accompanied by its factual 
basis is relevant to whether the opinion is material.282 For example, 
                                                                                                             
 277. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 
418 U.S. 264, 284–86 (1974). 
 278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. e (1977). 
 279. Id. 
 280. See supra Part IV.C.5.b. 
 281. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539(1) (1977) (“A statement 
of opinion as to facts not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient 
may, if it is reasonable to do so, be interpreted by him as an implied statement 
(a) that the facts known to the maker are not incompatible with his opinion; or 
(b) that he knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming it.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 282. E.g., Payne v. DeLuca, 433 F. Supp. 2d 547, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (“The 
press release dated April 27, 2000, included several statements which we 
consider puffery. Mr. DeLuca is quoted as saying, ‘The recent contract awards 
demonstrate our excellent reputation with a diverse range of clients and our 
broad and sophisticated skill base. Our April announcement of the acquisition of 
2013] OPINIONS ACTIONABLE 443 
 
 
 
Judge Lynch in the Southern District of New York rejected a 
securities fraud claim based on the opinion that “Winstar was fully 
funded” because the defendants disclosed the basis for their 
opinion: 
Plaintiffs’ contention that “there was no reasonable good 
faith basis to conclude with confidence that Winstar was 
fully funded” also misrepresents the reports at issue, 
because the reports clearly disclose the basis for 
defendants’ claim that Winstar was fully funded. . . . 
Considering all the circumstances, plaintiffs cannot prevail 
on a claim that defendants recklessly failed to disclose the 
lack of a reasonable basis for optimistic statements 
regarding Winstar’s future funding if defendants’ reports 
plainly disclosed the basis for their statements.283 
The precedent on this issue in the defamation context should help 
courts apply the evaluation–inference test. 
Further, courts in the securities fraud context already recognize 
the necessity of assessing the impact of an alleged 
misrepresentation on the “total mix of information” available to 
investors.284 This total mix analysis is comparable to the 
defamation analysis of whether an opinion is accompanied by its 
factual basis.285 Indeed, the weighty precedent in the defamation 
context to determine whether certain facts were stated or assumed 
could help guide courts as they perform a similar analysis in the 
securities fraud context.286 
                                                                                                             
 
W & H Pacific, Inc., . . . provides further evidence of the success of our 
diversification strategy.’” (emphasis removed)); Limantour v. Cray Inc., 432 F. 
Supp. 2d 1129, 1147 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (“To the extent these [factual] 
statements (most of which are not alleged to be false) have any effect, they raise 
an inference in Defendants’ favor that there was a factual basis for the positive 
statements concerning 2004 earnings.”). 
 283. In re Salomon Analyst Winstar Litig., No. 02-Civ-6171, 2006 WL 
510526, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006). 
 284. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
 285. See supra Part IV.C.5.b.  
 286. E.g., DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 8.2 (2010) 
(citing cases) (“Where the defendant does not express or state the underlying 
facts, they may nonetheless be ‘assumed facts.’ This assumption of facts might 
be justified for a number of reasons—some third party has stated them, the 
specific or specialized knowledge of the recipient, i.e., ‘knowledgeable listeners’ 
due to the publicity given the facts by the local media, a prior press release 
issued by defendant, the demonstrated presence of the facts in the public domain 
in the area of publication, or prior articles or editorials in the same newspaper.”). 
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Finally, as explained above, mere hyperbole or verbal abuse is 
not actionable in defamation because it “cannot ‘reasonably [be] 
interpreted as stating actual facts’ about an individual.”287 Courts, 
when drawing the line between nonactionable puffery and 
potentially material opinions for purposes of securities fraud, can 
similarly draw on this rich defamation precedent to identify those 
opinions that are so hyperbolic that they do not reasonably imply 
any false, material facts. 
6. Consistent with Comparable Test Applied in Common Law 
Fraud Context 
Although the Second Restatement of Torts does not articulate a 
test to differentiate between opinions potentially actionable at 
common law and mere puffery,288 a close study of the examples 
cited in the Restatement commentary shows that they are 
consistent with the reasonable implication test proposed in this 
Article. 
The tension between potentially actionable opinions and 
immaterial puffery exists in common-law fraud, as in securities 
fraud. The Restatement does not articulate a test to differentiate 
between potentially actionable opinions and mere puffery, instead 
merely recognizing that “some allowance must be made for 
puffing or depreciation by an adverse party.”289 To exemplify this 
“some allowance,” the commentary states that the opinion that a 
bond is a “good investment” is potentially actionable,290 while a 
dealer’s opinions that an automobile he is selling is a “dandy,” a 
“bearcat,” a “good little car,” “the pride of our line,” or “the best in 
the American market” are mere puffery.291  
                                                                                                             
 287. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990) (“This 
provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative 
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First, the Restatement classifies the opinion that a bond is a 
“good investment” as potentially actionable.292 The commentary 
clarifies that this opinion is not mere puffing “if the vendor knows 
that the interest on the bond has for years been in default and the 
corporation that issued it is in the hands of a receiver.”293 The 
commentary explains that “such a statement is so far removed from 
the truth as to make it a fraudulent misrepresentation of the 
character of the bond.”294 This result is consistent with the 
proposed reasonable implication test. If the “bond is a good 
investment” opinion were allegedly false because the bond was 
merely a mediocre investment, the opinion would be immaterial as 
a matter of law because no reasonable investor would infer a 
specific quality of investment from such a vague statement. If, on 
the other hand, the opinion were allegedly false because the bond 
is in default, the opinion would be potentially material because a 
reasonable investor would interpret this opinion as implying that 
the bond was not in default. Therefore, the Restatement 
commentary and this Article’s proposed reasonable implication 
test reach the same result. 
On the other hand, the Restatement classifies as nonactionable 
puffery a dealer’s opinions that an automobile he is selling is a 
“dandy,” a “bearcat,” a “good little car,” “the pride of our line,” or 
“the best in the American market.”295 The Restatement’s 
commentary does not explain why these opinions were allegedly 
false. Instead, it merely concludes that these opinions are 
immaterial as a matter of law:  
It is common knowledge and may always be assumed that 
any seller will express a favorable opinion concerning what 
he has to sell; and when he praises it in general terms, 
without specific content or reference to facts, buyers are 
expected to and do understand that they are not entitled to 
rely literally upon the words.296  
However, in a separate section, the Restatement recognizes that 
even statements that might otherwise seem like puffery can be 
actionable if they are fantastic: 
The habit of vendors to exaggerate the advantages of the 
bargain that they are offering to make is a well recognized 
fact. An intending purchaser may not be justified in relying 
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upon his vendor’s statement of the value, quality or other 
advantages of a thing that he is intending to sell as carrying 
with it any assurance that the thing is such as to justify a 
reasonable man in praising it so highly. However, a 
purchaser is justified in assuming that even his vendor’s 
opinion has some basis of fact, and therefore in believing 
that the vendor knows of nothing which makes his opinion 
fantastic.297 
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that, consistent with the 
reasonable implication test proposed in this Article, the 
aforementioned opinions about the car would be potentially 
material if the car were, in fact, inoperable. Although no 
reasonable investor would interpret these opinions as statements of 
fact about the car’s relative quality, a reasonable investor would 
infer that the car is at least operable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this Article proposes a new analytical framework to 
apply to statements of opinion in securities fraud cases. First, this 
Article agrees with most courts having addressed the issue that 
statements of opinion are only false if both objectively 
unreasonable and subjectively disbelieved.298 The dual-falsity 
requirement recognizes that there is “something special” about 
opinions, which reflect the speaker’s mental processes, and that 
this “something special” merits the heightened protection afforded 
by the subjective falsity requirement. Additionally, in light of the 
consequent necessity of differentiating between statements of fact 
and statements of opinion, this Article proposes the following 
novel evaluation–inference test: Does the statement express the 
speaker’s evaluation or inference of facts?299 This test, which 
draws on comparable precedent in the defamation and common 
law fraud contexts, pinpoints those statements that contain the 
aforementioned “something special.” Further, this Article responds 
to courts’ unsound materiality analyses of opinions by proposing 
the following new reasonable implication test to distinguish 
statements that are immaterial as a matter of law from those that 
are potentially material: Does the opinion reasonably imply an 
allegedly false, material fact?300 Comparable precedent developed 
in the defamation pure–mixed opinion context and in the common-
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law fraud puffery–opinion context should guide courts as they 
apply the reasonable implication test in the securities fraud 
context. Securities fraud jurisprudence would benefit from 
identifying the “something special” about statements of opinion, 
recognizing how an opinion can be false, and distinguishing 
opinions that reasonably imply material facts from opinions that are 
mere puffery. 
  
